Indiana Law Journal
Volume 75

Issue 1

Article 11

Winter 2000

Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?
Martha McCarthy
Brigham Young University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, and the First Amendment
Commons

Recommended Citation
McCarthy, Martha (2000) "Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 75 : Iss. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol75/iss1/11

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The Normalized Free Exercise Clause:
Three Abnormalitiest
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS °
I.

INTRODUCTION: DEVIANCE AND NORMALITY IN FREE EXERCISE

DOCTRINE .................................................... 78
II. DEVIANCE AND THE RATIONAL BASIS RULE: STANDARDS OF REVIEW

FOR INCIDENTAL BURDENS ON FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS ............... 85

A. ConductRegulation andIncidentalBurdens on Speech ............. 85
B. Incidental Burdenson Religious Exercise and the "Normal" Standard
ofReview .................................................... 89
I.DEVIANCE AND THE PERMISSIVE ACCOMMODATION RULE: STANDARDS
OF REVIEW FOR BENIGN USE OF SUSPECT CLASSIFYING TRAITS ............ 95

A. "Benign" Racial DiscriminationUnder the Equal ProtectionClause ... 95
B. Invidious ReligiousDiscriminationandPermissiveReligious
Accommodation Under the Religion Clauses ........................ 96
C. Permissive Religious Accommodation and the "Normal"
StandardofReview .......................................... 99
IV. DEVIANCE AND THE STRICT SCRUTINY EXCEPTION: STANDARDS OF REVIEW
FOR UNDERINCLUSIVE CLASSIFICATIONS ............................ 104

A. The FundamentalRights/Equal ProtectionDoctrine andthe
Problem of Legislative Underinclusion ...........................
1. Development of the Fundamental Rights/Equal Protection Doctrine .
2. The Fundamental Rights/Equal Protection Doctrine and
Legislative Underinclusion ................................
B. Underinclusiveness,GeneralApplicability, and the Smith Doctrine ...
C. Underinclusive Secular Classificationsand the "Normal"
StandardofReview ..........................................
V. CONCLUSION: THE SMITH DOCTRINE AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF

104
105
108
113
115

RELIGION AS A NONPREFERRED RIGHT ............................. 119

f Copyright © 2000 Frederick Mark Gedicks. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School; gedicksf@lawgate.byu.edu.
I am grateful to Jay Bybee, Dan Conkle, Rick Duncan, Abner Greene, Chip Lupu, Bill
Marshall, Jim Rasband, Brett Scharffs, Steve Smith, Eugene Volokh, and Kevin Worthen for
criticisms of earlier versions of this Article. I benefitted from discussions of some of the
arguments in faculty workshops at Brigham Young University Law School, the Cumberland
Law School of Samford University, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, the
University of Utah College of Law, and Wake Forest University School of Law. Justin
Denton, Elizabeth Grimshaw, Brad Hunt, Jeanette McGlannery, and Sylvan Morley provided
indispensable research assistance. I am indebted to Dean H. Reese Hansen and the Faculty
Research Committee at Brigham Young University Law School for summerresearch funding.
Finally, my thanks to Dan Conkle, David Smith, and the Poynter Center at Indiana University
for an unusually stimulating and well-organized conference.

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 75:77

The "compelling government interest" requirement seems benign, because it
is familiar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met before
the governmentmay accord different treatment on the basis of race, or before the
government may regulate the content of speech, is not remotely comparable to
using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces in those other
fields-equality oftreatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech--are
constitutional norms; what it would produce here--a private right to ignore
generally applicable laws-is a constitutional anomaly.
-Employment Division v. Smith (1990)
I. INTRODUCTION: DEVIANCE AND NORMALITY IN
FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE

The Supreme Court's controversial abandonment of the religious exemption
doctrine in Employment Division v. Smith' is by now well-known. For nearly thirty

years, it was thought that government violated the Free Exercise Clause2 when it
enforced against believers laws that incidentally burdened their religious practices,
unless such laws were shown to protect a compelling interest in the least restrictive

manner? In other words, in the absence of a compelling interest, people were
constitutionally "exempt" from complying with government action that interfered
with the practice oftheir religion, even when the interference was simply incidental
to the achievement of an otherwise legitimate government goal. In 1990, however,

the Court abandoned the exemption doctrine, holding in Smith that the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits intentional government burdens on religion, but not incidental
ones.4 In a majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court indicated that

1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
UnemploymentAppeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. ReviewBd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) [hereinafter Unemployment Compensation
Cases]. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
4. 494 U.S. at 872.
The majority indicated two exceptions to this rule, when the burdensome law contains a
procedure for "individualized assessment" of the circumstances of individuals burdened by
the law's general requirements, id. at 884 (discussing the Unemployment Compensation
Cases), and when the burdensome law infringes upon a "hybrid right"--that is, a right
protected by more than one constitutional provision. Id. at 881 (discussing Yoder, 406 U.S.

at 205).
I argue elsewhere in this Article that the "individualized assessment" exception is best
understood as a form of general applicability analysis. See infra Part IV.C. The "hybrid
rights" exception adds nothing to current constitutional doctrine. If government action
burdening religious practices does not trigger strict scrutiny under free exercise doctrine, it
is hard to see why the fact that it would trigger such scrutiny under the doctrine of another
constitutional provision adds anything to the free exercise claim. See Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
Similarly, if strict scrutiny is already triggered by another constitutional provision, nothing
is added to this other claim by the Free Exercise Clause.
The hybrid rights exception to Smith would make a difference only ifa right were protected
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while legislatures and other government actors are free to fashion religious
exemptions from general laws if they so choose, such exemptions are not required
as a matter of constitutional right, and thus cannot be mandated by the judiciary.5
Subsequent decisions suggest that Smith continues to enjoy the support of a
majority of the Court. In Church ofthe Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc. v. City offHialeah,
the Court held that strict scrutiny is called for when religiously burdensome
government action is not religiously neutral or generally applicable.6 Nevertheless,
the Court cited with approval Smith's rejection of the exemption doctrine in all other
situations.7 In City ofBoerne v. Flores, a six-person majority likewise reaffirmed

by two constitutional provisions, either of which by itself would trigger only rational basis
scrutiny, butwhich combined achieve a critical constitutional mass which calls forheightened
scrutiny. See Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights
Legislation, PublicPolicy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DANE L. REv. 393, 430-31
(1994); Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion after the Fall: The Case for
IntermediateScrutiny, 39 WM. &MARYL. REv. 925, 930 (1998); see also Mark V. Tushnet,

HybridRights-Reply(visitedSept 23,1997) <religionlaw@listserv.ucla.edu> (discussing and
rejecting the argument that the penumbral rights analysis of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479,484-85 (1965), is aninstance ofhybrid rights analysis). Although one court appears
to have applied the hybrid rights exception in this manner, see Thomas v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 707-11 (9th Cir. 1999), most courts have not, see William L.
Esser IV, Note, ReligiousHybrids in the Lower Courts:FreeExercisePlusor Constitutional
Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211,242-43 (1998).
5. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
Notwithstanding their endorsement in Smith, permissive accommodations defined in
sectarian or religious terms may be suspect under the Establishment Clause unless they
compensate for some unique constitutional or legal disability suffered by religion. See infra
Part IE.B. Compare Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding against Establishment Clause
challenge exemption of nonprofit activities of religious institutions from antidiscrimination
requirements of Title VII), and Zorach v. Clawson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a public
school released-time program of religious instruction), with Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (holding that drawing boundaries of school
district to coincide with membership in orthodox Jewish sect violated Establishment Clause),
Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (same with respect to sales tax exemption
available only to religious magazines), andEstate of Thornton v. Calder, 472 U.S. 703 (1985)
(same with respect to a statute mandating that employees be excused from working on their
Sabbath). See generally City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") violates
Establishment Clause by providing exemptions only for burdens on religious practice);
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
ConstitutionalBasisfor ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 1245 (1994)
(arguing that constitutional protection is not granted to religion for its unique value, but
instead because it is uniquely vulnerable to discrimination); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An
Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility ofReligious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK.
LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998) (arguing that current legal theory has supplied no persuasive
justification for religious exemptions, and that contemporary legal culture will likely prevent
the emergence of any such justifications).
6. 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
7. See id. at 531.
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Smith when it struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as beyond
Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.8
Smith does not suffer from a shortage of critics.9 To date, however, no one has

8. 521 U.S. 507, 512-16 (1997).
Intended to reinstate the exemption doctrine as a rule of decision in free exercise cases,
RFRA prohibited the enforcement of federal and state laws against believers whose religious
practices were substantially burdened by such laws, unless government could show that
enforcement was the least restrictive means of implementing a compelling interest. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(b), 2000bb-1 (1994). Since the governmental entity before the Court was
a city and Section 5 deals only with Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
against the states and their subdivisions, Boerne did not formally invalidate RFRA as applied
against federal government entities. Language in the opinion, however, suggests that the
Court might view RFRA's limitations on federal government action infirm on separation of
powers grounds. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803)).
Numerous commentators have argued that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to federal
government action. See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The
Implicationsfor RFRA and Separationof Powers,56 MoNT. L. REv. 5 (1996); Christopher
L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is

Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. RFV. 437, 469-73 (1994); Eugene Gressman & Angela C.
Carmella, The RFRA Revision ofthe FreeExercise Clause,57 OHIo ST. L.J. 65,119-25,13239 (1996); MarciA. Hamilton, City ofBoerne v. Flores: A LandmarkforStructuralAnalysis,

39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 699, 718-21 (1998); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom
RestorationAct is Unconstitutional,Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 14-19 (1998).

The lower courts are split. CompareWaguespack v. Rodriguez, 220 B.R. 31,36-37 (Bankr.
W.D. La. 1998), United States v. Sandia, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D.N.M. 1997), aiidlnre Gates
Community Chapel, 212 B.R. 220,225-26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997), with Young v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43
(1998), Morehouse v. United States, No. CIV.A.3:97-CV-0330-D, 1998 WL 320268, at *3
&n.6 (N.D. Tex. June 8,1998), Hodge v. Fitzgerald, 220 B.R. 386,393-401 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1998), and Steckler v. United States, No. CIV.A.96-1054, 1998 WL 28235, at *2 (W.D. La.
Jan. 26, 1998). A number of courts have assumed without holding that RFRA applies to
federal claims. See, e.g., Alamo v. Clay, 137 F.3d 1366, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Tinsley v.
Department of Justice, No. 97-5014,1997 WL 529068, *1 (D.C. Cir. July 31, 1997); United
States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 792 n.6 (5th Cir. 1997); Packard v. United States, 7 F. Supp.
2d 143, 146-47 (D. Conn. 1998); see also Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the

CourtWasRight-Reflections on City ofBoerne v. Flores, 39 WM. &MARYL. REv. 793,810
(1998) ("RFRA as applied to the federal government ...

does not threaten the Court's

Marbury function in the manner suggested by RFRA as applied to the states.").
As this Article went to press, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999 ("RLPA"), which generally would require
application of the compelling interest test against government action that affects foreign,
interstate, and Indian commerce or that is part of a federally funded program or activity. See
H.R. 1691, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1999). RLPA also would prohibit religious
discrimination in the administration of land use regulations, see id. § 3, and would amend
RFRA to clarify that it is applicable to federal government action. See id. § 7.
9. Forrepresentative examples ofthe voluminous academic criticism ofSmith, see James
D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REv. 91 (1991); Douglas
Laycock, The Remnants ofFreeExercise, 1990 SuP. CT.REv. 1; MichaelW. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cml. L. REv. 1109 (1990); Steven D.
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challenged the rhetorical lynch pin of the opinion-namely, its contention that
abandonment of the exemption doctrine restored free exercise jurisprudence to
constitutional normality. This Article takes up that challenge: whatever one thinks
of Smith, it should not be permitted to masquerade as normal constitutional law.
The doctrine of free exercise articulated in Smith, applied in Lukumi, and
confirmed in Boerne-what I will refer to hereafter as the "Smith
doctrine"--consists of three rules:
(1) The Rational Basis Rule. Religiously neutral and generally applicable
government action that incidentally burdens religions exercise is subject to minimal
judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause."0
(2) The Permissive Accommodation Rule. Although judges lack authority to
mandate religious exemptions fromburdensome legislation that is religiously neutral
and generally applicable, Congress and state legislatures are free to enact such
exemptions if they wish."
(3) The Strict Scrutiny Exception. Strict scrutiny of religiously burdensome
government action is called for only if the action is not religiously neutral or
generally applicable.12

Smith, The Rise and Fall ofReligious Freedom in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 149 (1991). A handful of commentators defend the result in Smith, though not its
reasoning. See Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: FreeExerciseExemptions and the Siren Song
ofLiberalism,20 HOFSTRAL. REv. 245 (1991); William P. Marshall, InDefense ofSmith and
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHL L. REV. 308 (1991) [hereinafter Marshall, Free
Exercise Revisionism]; William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally
CompelledFreeExercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 357 (1990); Suzanna Sherry,
Lee v. Weisman: ParadoxRedux, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 123; Mark V. Tushnet, The Rhetoric
ofFreeExercise, 1993 BYU L. REv. 117; Ellis West, The CaseAgainst a Right to ReligionBased Exemptions, 4 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcS & PuB. POL'Y 591 (1990).
10. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531; Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-80, 882,
884-85 (1990).
11.
Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in
the Bill of Rights are not thereby [insulated] from the political process. Just as a
society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First
Amendment is likely to enact laws that affinatively foster the dissemination of the
printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to
religious beliefcan be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.
...But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or
even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the
appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (dictum); accordBoard ofEduc. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) ("Mhe Constitution allows the State to accommodate
religious needs by alleviating special burdens. Our cases leave no doubt that in commanding
neutrality the Religion Clauses do not require the government to be oblivious to impositions
that legitimate exercises of state power may place on religious belief and practice.").
12. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-32, 533, 546; Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78 ("It would be
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One of the touchstones of the Smith doctrine is the allegedly deviant character of
religious exemptions in comparison to doctrines developed under other individual
rights clauses of the Constitution. Smith itself distinguished use of the compelling
interest test in equal protection and speech cases from its use in free exercise cases,
emphasizing the exemption doctrine's anomalous consequence of excusing religious
believers from complying with a validly enacted law possessed of a legitimate
legislative purpose. 3 Smith pointed out that the exemption doctrine permitted a
believer to frustrate "[tihe government's ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct," and thus allowed a believer to become "a
law unto himself' in violation of "both constitutional tradition and common sense." 4
Boerne confined that the Court continues to believe that the exemption doctrine's
"constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability" had produced an
"anomaly in the law."' 5
The exemption doctrine is aberrational. The text of the Free Exercise Clause does
not require that believers be excused from complying with laws that burden their
religious practices,16 and most commentators have concluded that there is no
originalist justification for the exemption doctrine. 7 For most of its history, the

true ...that a State would be 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' if it sought to ban
[physical] acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only
because of the religious belief that they display.").
13. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
14. Id.at 885 (citations and footnote omitted).
15. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997).
16. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-78; Eisgruber & Sager, supranote 5, at 1270-72; see also
Marshall, FreeExerciseRevisionism, supranote 9, at 325 (arguing that the text of the First
Amendment "is consistent with protecting religion from discrimination; it does not compel
discrimination in favor of religion"); West, supranote 9, at 621-22 ("It is not enough.., to
say that the Constitution gives religion special protection ....
What is at issue, rather, is how
much protection the Constitution gives religion and, specifically, whether it guarantees a right
on the part of religious individuals and groups to religion-based exemptions.").
17. See, e.g., MICHAEL J.MALBIN, RELGION AND PoLrrlcs (1978); STEVEN D. SMITH,
FoREoRDAuN'D FAiLuRE chs. 2-4 (1995); Bradley, supra note 9, at 261-306; Phillip
Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight ofReligious Exemptions:An HistoricalPerspective,60
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise
Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the FourteenthAmendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106,
1110-18 (1994); West, supra note 9, at 623-33. As Justice Scalia noted in Boerne, even so
strong a supporter of exemptions as Professor McConnell was able to conclude only that
judicially mandated exemptions were not unknown to the framers. 521 U.S. at 537-38 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (discussing Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understandingofthe FreeExercise ofReligion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1415 (1990)). Even
McConnell's modest conclusion was attacked as methodologically unsound. See Tushnet,
supranote 9, at 124-27.
Professor Lash has argued that the understanding of the Free Exercise Clause at the time
that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified included the exemption doctrine. Lash, supra.
Lash argues that many congressional supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment were aware
of the incidental burdens that antebellum slavery laws had imposed on religious practices. Id.
at 1133-37. Laws prohibiting the expression of abolitionist sentiment incidentally burdened
religious liberty to the extent that one's opposition to slavery was a matter of religious faith,

20001

NORMALIZED FREEEXERCISE CLA USE

Supreme Court has refused to recognize a free exercise right to exemptions. 8 Even
when the doctrine was supposedly in force, the Court denied most claims for
exemptions.' 9

as it was for many abolitionists. See id. at 1137. Laws prohibiting slaves from being taught
to read prevented them from studying the Bible, and laws restricting the times and places
when slaves could meet made it difficult for them to participate in Christian worship. See id.
at 1135. Lash also notes that a slight majority of the states provided religious exemptions
from the military draft See id.at 1141-45. Lash suggests that when these supporters described
religious exercise to be a "privilege or immunity of citizenship" to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, they understood this protection to include the right to be excused
from complying with at least some religiously burdensome general laws, such as laws
regulating slavery and the universal military draft. Id. at 1147-56.
Lash's argument is not persuasive in the context of the contemporary controversy over
exemptions. Abolitionists opposed slavery because they believed it to be an evil practice, not
because the laws which regulated it incidentally burdened religious practices. By contrast, the
legitimacy of contemporary laws that incidentally burden religious practices is rarely in
dispute. The abolitionist argument that laws supporting slavery incidentally burdened the
religious exercise of slaves and Southern abolitionists must be understood as a tactic
employed to support the strategic opposition to slavery in general. As to religious exemptions
from the military draft, it is enough to note that nearly as many states did not provide for
exemptions as did.
Finally, as Lash himselfadmits, abolitionists and others in the mid-nineteenth century were
largely concerned with the burdens slavery laws imposed on the religious practices of
Protestant Christianity, which by then had grown into the de facto national religion of the
United States. See id. at 1122-25. See generallyFRDERMCKMARK GEDICKS, TimRHrTOiuc
OF CHURCH AND STATE 15-16, 17-18 (1995). As Mormon polygamists were shortly to

discover, there was little doubt that unconventional religious practices were not constitutionally protected fromthe adverse effects oflaws enforcing or preferring Protestant Christian
mores. See Lash, supra,at 1125-29. See generally GEDICKS, supra, at 16-17.
Consequently, it remains doubtful that any contemplated application of the Free Exercise
Clause against the States was understood to include a presumptive right to be excused from
complying with any law which incidentally prohibits or burdens any religious practice.
18. When the Court first passed on the meaning ofthe clause inReynolds v. UnitedStates,
98 U.S. 145 (1879), it held that although the clause deprived Congress of power over religious
belief, it left Congress free to regulate all actions "in violation of social duties or subversive
of good order," even if religiously motivated. Id. at 164. Reynolds not only controlled the
disposition of free exercise claims through the end of the nineteenth century, see, e.g., Late
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48,49
(1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45
(1885), it survived well into the twentieth, see, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607
(1961) (plurality opinion by Warren, C.J.); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
& n.4 (1940).
19. Compare Unemployment Compensation Cases (holding believers exempt from
"availability for work" requirements ofstate unemployment compensation lawsthat burdened
exercise oftheir faith), andWisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding Amish exempt
from compulsory school attendance law), with Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) (denying television ministry exemption from general tax
on sales of Bibles), O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (denying Muslim
prison inmates exemption from policy which prevented them from attending worship
services), Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (denying orthodox Jewish serviceman
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By the Court's emphasis on the deviant character ofthe exemption doctrine, then,
one is given to understand that abandonment of this doctrine has returned the Free
Exercise Clause to constitutional normality.2" This understanding, however, is
demonstrably incorrect, even if the exemption doctrine is itself constitutionally
aberrant. The Smith doctrine deviates in important ways from the doctrinal structure
used by the Court under comparable individual rights clauses ofthe Constitution. The
Rational Basis Rule contradicts the Court's Speech Clause doctrine governing
situations virtually identical to incidental burdens on religious exercise-namely,
incidental burdens on speech occurring as the result of otherwise legitimate
government regulation of conduct or the time, place, or manner of expression.2 The
Permissive Accommodation Rule contradicts the Court's Equal Protection Clause
doctrine governing so-called "benign" or "remedial" classifications which rely on
suspect traits. 2 Finally, the Strict Scrutiny Exception relies on an understanding of
"general applicability" that is at odds with earlier precedent that calls for heightened
scrutiny of underinclusive legislative classifications that burden the exercise of
preferred constitutional rights, even when the burden is incidental.' I conclude that,
far from being an expression of doctrinal normality, the Smith doctrine makes sense
only on the assumption that the right of religious free exerise is not fundamental.
Notwithstanding the presence of the Free Exercise Clause in the text of the First
Amendment, the Smith doctrine necessarily presupposes that the Free Exercise
Clause does not delineate a domain of preferred liberty. 4

exemption from uniform regulation which prevented his wearing a yarmulke), Jensen v.
Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (affumning by equally divided Court denial of exemption from
driver's license photograph requirement to person who believed photographs were "graven
images" in violation of the Ten Commandments), Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary
of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (denying religious foundation exemption from federal labor
regulations), Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying fundamentalist
Christian university exemption from-regulation which denies tax exemption to racially
discriminatory educational institutions), and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
(denying Amish employer exemption from Social Security taxes). See alsoBowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693 (1986) (holding native American not burdened by government's use of Social
Security number previously assigned to his daughter in violationofhis religious beliefs); Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1985) (holding Native
American worshippers not burdened by federal land use plan that would destroy their
religion).
The exemption doctrine fared just as poorly in the lower courts. See James Ryan, Note,
Smith and the Religious Freedom RestorationAct: An IconoclasticAssessment, 78 VA. L.
REv. 1407, 1416-17 (1992). This is true even in its RFRA incarnation. See Ira C.Lupu, The
Failureof RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LrTrLE ROCKL. REV. 575, 585-97 (1998).
20. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (arguing that incidental government burdens on religious
practice are no more uncdnstitutional than incidental government burdens on the activities of
the press).
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part Ml.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
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II. DEVIANCE AND THE RATIONAL BASIS RULE:
STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR INCIDENTAL BURDENS
ON FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

A. Conduct Regulation and IncidentalBurdens on Speech

The Supreme Court has two doctrinal tests relating to regulation of conduct that
incidentally burdens speech. The O'Brien test, taking its name from the case in
which it was formulated, provides that government regulation of conduct which
adversely affects one's ability to express herself is nevertheless constitutional if it is
"within the... power of government," furthers an "important or substantial
governmental interest," is "unrelated to the suppression of free expression," and is
"no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."' The second test
provides that government regulation of the time, place, or manner of expression in
public forums will be upheld only so long as it is "content-neutral," is "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest," and leaves open "ample
alternative channels" for communicating the speaker's message.26
Although the Court developed these two tests in separate contexts, they deal with
the same conceptual problem. As Professor Kalven pointed out, there is no such thing
as "pure speech"; the act of speaking always entails conduct,2 1 and all conduct is
presumptively subject to government regulation.' The typical conduct regulation
seeks to control actions that are not normally associated with expression (say,
destruction of government documents), with the consequence that resulting burdens
on the speaker's ability to disseminate her message appear incidental or, indeed,

"accidental." By contrast, the typical time, place, or manner regulation seeks to
control actions that are closely associated with the act of speaking, such as the time
of day the speaker speaks (say, 12:30 P.M. but not 3:00 A.M.), where the speaker is
physically located (in a city park but not in a residential neighborhood), or how the
speaker's message is disseminated (by handbills butnotby amplified sound), with the
consequence that resulting burdens on the speaker's ability to disseminate her
message appear intentional."

25. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Since the first element ofthe test
is an implicit part of any constitutional challenge, O'Brien is really only a three-part test,
requiring that conduct regulations that incidentally burden speech be content-neutral, further
an important orsubstantial government interest, and intrude no more than necessary to further
this interest. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorizationand Balancingin FirstAmendmentAnalysis,88 HARV.L. REv. 1482, 1483

n.10 (1975).
26. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983)); accordWard v. RockAgainst Racism, 491

U.S. 781,791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984)); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-51
(1981).
27. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept ofthePublicForum:Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 23-25, 27.
28. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 & n.4 (1940).
29. Cf.David S. Day, The Hybridizationof the Content-NeutralStandards of the Free
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Time, place, or manner regulations seem to be more direct restrictions on speech
than conduct regulations, but only because the conduct they seek to regulate is more
commonly associated with the act of speaking. In both cases the essential regulatory
act is the same: government is attempting to control conduct for legitimate reasons
ostensibly unrelated to the content or communicative impact of the speaker's
message, with the incidental result that the speaker may be silenced or burdened in
the dissemination of her message." As Justice Kennedy has observed, this often
results in situations in which the "regulation at issue can be described with equal
accuracy as a regulation of the manner of expression, or as a regulation of conduct
with an expressive component."3"
The two tests are, in fact, doctrinally similar. O'Brien'srequirement ofa regulatory
motive "unrelated to the suppression of free expression" is simply a more abstract
way of stating the content-neutrality requirement of the time, place, or manner
decisions.32 Although O'Brien does not formally cite "ample communicative
alternatives" as part of its analysis, as do the time, place, or manner decisions, this
element is generally thought to be an implicit part of the test.33 Professors Nowack

Speech Clause, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195, 200-01 (1987) (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
("[T]he traditional distinction between the [time, place, or manner and O'Brien] tests
originally developed from the judicial perception that the TPM regulation involves a
deliberate effort by the government to restrict expression. [W]hile a TPM regulation is
established for the purpose of abridging protected expression, an incidental regulation is a
nonpurposeful abridgement.") (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
30. Cf. TurnerBroad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,663 (1994) (Turnerl) (holding that
time, place, and manner regulations and conduct regulations are both evaluated under the
same standard of review as "content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on
speech").
31. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 704 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
32. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 388-89 (stating that even when a conduct regulation satisfies all of the O'Brien
criteria, the regulation may still be struck down if it "has the effect of entirely preventing a
'speaker' from reaching a significant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully
communicate'); JoHN E. NowAcK &RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 16.47,
at 1143 (5th ed. 1995) (including within the "least restrictive means" element ofthe O'Brien
test "whether the regulation leaves open ample means for communication ofthe message and
is not an unnecessary or gratuitous suppression of communication"); Howard M. Friedman,
Why Do You Speak That Way?--Symbolic ExpressionReconsidered, 15 HAsTiNGS CoNST.
L.Q. 587, 593 (1988) ("The issue of effective communication [under O'Brien]parallels the
requirement for effective alternative channels of conunuication in the 'time, place, and
manner' test applied in more general first amendment contexts involving access to streets,
sidewalks, or parks for expressive purposes."); seealso Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S.
697, 705 (1986) (upholding under O'Brien the application of a statutory closure penalty
against a bookstore because "the [storeowners] remain free to sell the same materials at
another location"); Members ofthe CityCouncilv. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812
(1984) (upholding under O'Brien the application of a ban on the posting of signs on public
property against political candidates because "nothing in the findings indicates that the
posting of political posters on public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of
communication, or that [the candidates'] ability to communicate effectively is threatened by
ever-increasing restrictions on expression").
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and Rotunda explain that O'Brien and the time, place, or manner decisions are
simply "two slightly different forms" of the same test.' O'Brien states "the general
principle" that determines the constitutional permissibility of conduct regulation,
whereas the time, place, and manner decisions elaborate "on this general principle
by restating it in terms of a three-part test" 35 Despite apparent differences between
O'Brien and the time, place, and manner decisions, the Court itself does not
distinguish between them,' and lower courts understand the tests to have been
37
merged.

Formally, at least, O'Brien and the time, place, or manner decisions dictate
intermediate scrutiny ofburdens on freedom ofexpression,' what Professor Gunther
once called a more meaningful rational basis test.39 Both permit incidental burdens
on speech so long as such burdens are content-neutral and alleviate a "real" harm (as
opposed to a merely "conjectural" one) in a "direct and material way."4" This

34. NOWACK & ROTUNDA, supranote 33, § 16.47, at 1143.

35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,798 (1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984); see also Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804-05, 808-10
(applying O'Brien to a regulation of street posters, but basing analysis of the less restrictive
alternative factor on time, place, or manner decisions).
37. See, e.g., Pica v. Sarno, 907 F. Supp. 795, 801 (D.N.J. 1995); Century Fed., Inc. v.
City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1559, 1570-71 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
38. See Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622, 664-65 (1994); see also Michael C. Dorf,Incidental
Burdens on FundamentalRights,109 HARV.L. REv. 1176,1201 n.101 (1996) (citing Turner
I as an example of"a more stringent form of intermediate scrutiny"). Other commentators
have'argued that O'Brien scrutiny is little better than minimal rational basis scrutiny. See,
e.g., Dean Alfange, Jr., FreeSpeech andSymbolic Conduct: The Draft-CardBurning Case,
1968 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 15, 17, 23, 41-42; Eugene Volokh, A Common Law Model for
Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLAL. REV. 1465, 1498-1501 (1999).
39.
Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the
Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its
imagination. It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative
purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture.
Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable
means on the basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than
resorting to rationalizations created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing.
Gerald Gunther, Foreword:In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972); see also Scott H. Bice,
RationalityAnalysis in ConstitutionalLaw, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 30 (1980) ("Progression
from the 'any conceivable goal' approach to the requirement that there be some actual
evidence that the legislature intended a particular goal is commonly associated with
'intermediate' scrutiny.").
40. Turner1, 512 U.S. at 664 (plurality opinion). Althoughthis analysis was contained in
the plurality opinion, it was adopted by a majority on remand. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997). The Court's analysis has also been relied onbyanumber
of the federal circuits. See, e.g., Jones Intercable ofSan Diego, Inc. v. City of Chula Vista, 67
F.3d 846, 851-53 (9th Cir. 1995); Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 944-48 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc); US
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standard is borrowed from the Court's recent commercial speech cases, which hold
that legitimate restrictions on commercial speech must be in service to "real" rather
than merely "conceivable" government goals," and that the fit between such
regulations and these goals must be substantial rather than attenuated.Y This
standard of review is less exacting than the strict scrutiny normally-applied to
"suspect" government regulations of speech like discrimination on the basis of
content or viewpoint, since it does not require that the regulation be "necessary" to
a "compelling" government interest.' At the same time, however, the standard is
more meaningful than the rational basis tautology, under which the Court simply
imagines the requisite governmental purpose based upon the apparent effect of the
law in question.'

West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1104-06 (9th Cir. 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 199-202 (4th Cir. 1994).
41. See, e.g., Edenfeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,770-71 (1993) (holding that the burden of
justification for a restriction on commercial speech "is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture," but can be met only by a demonstration that the harm the restriction addresses
is "real").
42. See, e.g., id. (stating that restrictions on commercial speech must further legitimate
government interests "to a material degree"); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410,417 n.13 (1993) (quoting Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
480 (1989)):
[W]hile we have rejected the "least-restrictive-means" test for judging
restrictions on commercial speech, so too have we rejected mere rational-basis
review. A regulation need not be "absolutely the least severe that will achieve
the desired end," but if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome
alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant
consideration in determining whether the "fit" between ends and means is
reasonable.
43. As in O'Brien, the Court has sometimes understood the less restrictive alternative
requirement to mean only that no equally-as-effective alternative be available. See, e.g., Bice,
supra note 39, at 37-38 (citing Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)).
Under classic strict scrutiny analysis, however, a "least restrictive alternative" requirement
is usually understood to impose upon government the heavier burden of showing that
alternatives would substantiallyundermine the government's protection of its compelling
interest, rather than merely showing that the alternatives would be less effective to some
slight degree. See Ely, supranote 25, at 1486-87. Thus, a showing ofan alternative regulation
that is substantially less restrictive of speech while only undermining the government's
purpose to a slight degree is a "less restrictive alternative" even though not as efficient as the
regulation under attack. This version of the requirement is more burdensome for the
government because it requires a demonstration that the deprivation of civil liberty caused by
its action does not outweigh the state's interest in avoiding a small inefficiency in carrying
out its legislative purpose. See Bice, supra note 39, at 38-39.
Although the time, place, and manner decisions entail some balancing at the margin, the
mere existence of a less restrictive alternative (in terms of a balance at the margin) does not
automatically result in a determination ofunconstitutionality, as itwould under strict scrutiny.
44. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,488-91 (1955); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949); Bice, supra note 39, at 30; see also
Gunther, supranote 39, at 33 (When engaging inmeaningful rationalbasis reviewduring the
1971 Term, "the Court was less willing to strain for conceivable justifications, less ready to
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B. Incidental Burdens on Religious Exercise and the
"Normal" StandardofReview

Neither Smith nor Lukumi expressly sets forth a standard of review under the Free
Exercise Clause for incidental burdens on religion. It is evident, however, that such
burdens trigger, at most, minimal scrutiny. Both Smith andLukumi are hostile to the
general notion of heightened judicial scrutiny of government action that imposes
incidental burdens on religious practice, with Smith generally criticizing the
application of strict scrutiny in such situations,45 and Lukumi expressly confining it
to laws lacking religious neutrality or general applicability.'M Neither opinion set forth
anything like the O'Brienor time, place, or manner tests, or otherwise contained any
language suggesting intermediate or other heightened scrutiny falling short of the
compelling interesttesty Lower courts and commentators have generally understood
Smith to subject incidental burdens on religion to either minimal or no scrutiny under
the Free Exercise Clause."M
The Rational Basis Rule obviously contradicts the Court's application of
intermediate scrutiny to incidental burdens on speech and expression.49 The more

hypothesize imaginable facts that might underlie questionable classifications, less inclined
to tolerate substantial over- and underinclusiveness in deference to legislative flexibility.")..
45. EmploymentDiv. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) ("[W]e cannot afford the luxury
of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of
conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.") (emphasis in original).
46. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,531-32, 546
(1993).
47. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 700 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998)
(stating that "[t]he Smith opinion does not make it clear whether it is constitutionally
sufficient for a law or policy to be neutral and of general applicability, or whether the law or
policy will still have to satisfy some lesser standard than the compelling-interest test," such
as a "reasonable-relationship test").
48. See, e.g., St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir.
1990) ("[W]e understand Supreme Court decisions to indicate that neutral regulations that
diminish the income of a religious organization do not implicate the free exercise clause.");
Beck v. Missouri St. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 837 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Mo. 1993)
(upholding same action under Free Exercise Clause that it struck down as lacking minimal
rationality under the Equal Protection Clause), vacatedas moot, 18 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 1994);
Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom RestorationAct: The ConstitutionalSignificance
ofan UnconstitutionalStatute, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 39, 57 (1995) ("Smith held that general
laws burdening religious practice do not implicate the Free Exercise Clause at all, and
accordingly do not require any type of constitutional scrutiny."); Dorf, supra note 38, at 1180
("As a matter of constitutional law, the Court has essentially abandoned judicial review of
neutral laws that burden the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.") (citing Smith,
494 U.S. at 890); Laycock, supra note 9, at 10 ("The [Smith] Court held that Oregon can
suppress a worship service, and so long as that is the incidental effect of a generally
applicable law, Oregon need have no reason for refusing a religious exemption.").
Of course, even if the Free Exercise Clause does not require any scrutiny of incidental
burdens onreligious practices, such burdens remain subject to minimal rational basis scrutiny
under the Due Process Clause.
49. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Our
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relevant issue, however, is whether this makes any difference. Prior to the Court's
most recent pronouncements, it hadbeen suggested that, in practice, O 'Brienand the
time, place, or manner decisions apply no more than minimal scrutiny.' Thus, the
conflict of the Smith doctrine with Speech Clause doctrine might be more apparent

than real.
The suggestion that the time, place, or manner decisions apply deferential rational
basis scrutiny is simply wrong. Although the Court has applied the time, place, or
manner test to protect less speech than its language might suggest, it is not unusual
for the Court to invalidate laws under this test." In particular, the requirement of

free speech cases... recognize that neutral regulations that affect free speech values are
subject to a balancing, rather than a categorical, approach."); Smolla, supranote 4, at 938
("[Ilntermediate scrutiny is used in free speech cases in which 'neutral' laws nevertheless
place burdens on expression. Adoption of an intermediate scrutiny standard would thus work
no novel or arbitrary departure from the architecture of First Amendment doctrine, but would
instead bring principles governing the freedom of religion into sensible synchronization with
the principles governing freedom of speech."); see also Gordon, supra note 9, at 105-06
(suggesting that the intermediate scrutiny of 0'Brienand the time, place, ormanner decisions
is properly applied to incidental burdens on religious exercise); Robert Kamenshine, Strict
Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 147, 152-54 (1987) (same).
There is no contradiction, however, between the Rational Basis Rule and Justice Scalia's
understanding of the Free Speech Clause. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., Justice Scalia
argued that when a
regulation is a general law not specifically targeted at conduct, its application to
such conduct does not in my view implicate the First Amendment. [V]irtually
every law restricts conduct, and virtually any prohibited conduct can be
performed for an expressive purpose-ifonly expression ofthe fact that the actor
disagrees with the prohibition. It cannot reasonably be demanded, therefore, that
every restriction of expression incidentally produced by a general lawregulating
conduct pass normal First Amendment scrutiny, or even--as some of our cases
have suggested-that it bejustified by an "important or substantial" government
interest.
501 U.S. 560, 576 (1991) (Scalia, J., separately concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original) (citing O'Brien). To date, no other member of the Court has joined Justice Scalia's
effort to read the Free Speech Clause as narrowly as the Free Exercise Clause.
50. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions,54 U. Cm. L. REV. 46,4852 (1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions](arguing that O'Brien and the

time, place, or manner decisions "purport to have some bite, [but] in practice are
indistinguishable" from no scrutiny or minimal scrutiny); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 190 n.5 (1983)
[hereinafter Stone, ContentRegulation](arguing that the O'BrienCourt purported to be using
strict scrutiny, but actually used rational basis review); Volokh, supranote 38, at 1511-12,
1512 n.148 (explaining that expressive conduct doctrine applies less than strict scrutiny).
51. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (invalidating
injunction prohibiting, inter alia, the exhibition of images observable to a patient in an
abortion clinic and demonstrations within 300 feet of the clinic); International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (invalidating in part ordinance
prohibiting the sale or distribution of literature within airports); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of
handbills); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating ordinance
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ample communicative alternatives has meant that otherwise valid regulations are
struck down by the Court when they effectively prevent dissemination of the
speaker's message.52 This has been true in the lower courts as well.53 The result is a
general rule that complete prohibition ofa means of communicationviolates the First
Amendment. Moreover, the time, place, or manner decisions typically "balance at the
margin," evaluating "the incremental promotion of the interest on which the
government relies" in terms of "the incremental threat to free expression."' Thus,
the less restrictive alternative prong of the time, place, or manner test generally
triggers "a serious balancing of interests."55
Many laws which incidentally burden religious exercise, such as zoning
regulations, are closer to time, place, or manner regulation than O'Brien-type
conduct regulation. As applied to churches, synagogues, and other places ofworship,
for example, zoning regulations regulate the place at which individuals may engage
in religions exercise and worship, and thus restrict religion in the same manner as
parade permits and other such restrictions that regulate where speech and expression
may take place. Accordingly, application of time, place, or manner scrutiny to such

prohibiting the distribution of leaflets on any sidewalk or street).
52. Compare City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (striking down ban on
home-based signs because, inter alia, similarly inexpensive, convenient, and effective
communicative alternatives do not exist), Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61
(1981) (finding municipal ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment unconstitutional as
applied to nude dancing for failure to leave open adequate communicative alternatives), and
Martin, 319 U.S. at 145-46 (striking down a ban on door-to-door distribution of literature
because ofits widespread use, especially in "the poorly financed causes oflittle people"), with
Ward v. RockAgainstRacism, 491 U.S. 781,802 (1989) (holding that sound ordinance leaves
open ample alternative channels because it "does not attempt to ban any particular manner
or type of expression at a given place or time"), and Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (holding that prohibition on camping on certain national park
sites was a permissible time, place, or manner regulation as applied to those who wanted to
sleep overnight in tent city erected on these sites to dramatize the plight of the homeless,
because there existed no general barrier to communication ofthe speakers' message). See also
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 521-40 (1981) (Brennan, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., concurring in the result) (finding that an ordinance banning all outdoor
advertising display signs violates First Amendment).
53. See, e.g., Bery v. City ofNewYork, 97 F.3d 689,698 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that city
regulations prohibiting visual artists from exhibiting or selling their work at public places
without a license did not leave open the alternative channels of communication necessary to
survive First Amendment scrutiny), cert. denied,520 U.S. 1251 (1997); Cleveland Area Bd.
of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 88 F.3d 382, 388-90 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that city
ordinances regulating the size, number, and placement of signs did not leave open adequate
channels for communication); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721,736 (N.D.
Ill. 1994) (dictum) (finding that federal lawprohibiting telephone companies from providing
cable television directly to customers within their service areas does not leave open ample
channels of communication); International Eateries ofAm. v. Broward County, 726 F. Supp.
1556, 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that zoning ordinance prohibiting adult nightclubs
within a certain distance of churches, schools, day-care facilities, orresidential neighborhoods
did not leave ample alternative channels of communication).
54. Ely, supranote 25, at 1485 n.16.
55. Id. at 1486.
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laws is likely to give greater protection to religious exercise than it now enjoys under
the Smith doctrine.
With respect to conduct regulation, it is true that O'Brien has not often ended in
Supreme Court invalidation of the application of an otherwise valid law to
incidentally burdened speech or expression.' The easy response is that deferential
rational basis review never results-indeed, it cannot result-in a finding of
unconstitutionality, 7 and watered down scrutiny is better than none at all. Some
lower court decisions since Smith have accepted governmental justifications for
religiously burdensome laws that would be difficult to defend as plausibly directed at
"real" rather than merely "conceivable" problems, as is required by the Court's
reading of O 'Brien." Similarly, many lower courts since Smith do not apply even the
most modest least restrictive alternative analysis to incidental burdens on religion.59

56. Only two Supreme Court decisions have held an ostensibly content-neutral law
unconstitutional because ofthe incidental burdens it imposed on speech and expression. See
NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (finding the common law tort of
"malicious interference with a trade or calling" to be unconstitutional under O'Brien as
applied to nonviolent secondary boycott); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975)
(finding under O'Brien that appellants were likely to prevail on the merits ofinjunction based
on law regulating secondary effects ofnude dancing accompanied by consumption of alcohol,
which law by its terms applied to establishments which do not sell liquor).
57. See Bice, supra note 39, at 8. See generally Note, Legislative Purpose,Rationality,
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972) (arguing that rational basis review in any
form is pointless). Rational basis review has resulted in invalidation of government action
only when the Court applies the invigorated rationality standard suggested by Professor
Gunther, as in cases involving discrimination on the basis of a socially disfavored (albeit
nonsuspect) trait, see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (discrimination based on
same-sex orientation); City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(discrimination based on mental disability); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973) (discrimination based on welfare dependency); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (discrimination based on female gender), or burdens on the exercise of a preferred
(albeit nontextual) constitutional right, see, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(burden on reproductive autonomy).
58. See, e.g., Beck v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 837 F. Supp. 998 (E.D.
Mo. 1993) (upholding transfer rule that penalized athletes transferring from public to private
(including religious) schools, but not those transferring from private to public schools, despite
absence of any evidence that private schools had an advantage over public schools in
attracting athletes, or that private schools were recruiting public school athletes), vacatedas
moot, 18 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Rick Peoples, Referees Spike Headdress,PRESsENTERPRISE, Sept. 30, 1994, available in 1994 WL 5080607 (reporting that school officials
would not let a female volleyball player wear a hijab during games for safety reasons).
59. See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 700 n.5 (10th Cir.
1998) (upholding a school district's exclusion of a home-schooled student from attending
classes part-time as "a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate governmental interest"
without considering whether there were less restrictive means of"ensur[ing] that any student
attending the public school on a part-time-basis provides a concomitant source of state
financial aid"); St. Bartholomew's Church v. City ofNew York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir.
1990) (upholding landmark preservation ordinance without examining less restrictive
alternatives of achieving preservation objectives); Storm v. Town of Woodstock, 32 F.
Supp. 2d 520 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (upholding as legitimate safety and anti-crime measure
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Even a tepid application ofintermediate scrutiny to such situations is likely to result
in occasional invalidation on such grounds.
The more important consequence of applying O'Brien scrutiny to incidental
burdens on religion is the likelihood that courts will find a lack of adequate
alternatives to burdened religious exercise more often than they have found a lack of
communicative alternatives to speech burdened by conduct regulations. Professor
Stone has suggested that incidental burdens on speech are struck down so
infrequently because alternative means of communicating the speaker's message are
almost always available.' By contrast, alternative means of engaging in religious
worship and otherwise satisfying religious obligations are frequently not available
when the government incidentally burdens religious exercise."' As a result, the
determination whether the religious claimant has "ample alternative means" of
practicing his or her religion may well lead to more frequent invalidation of
government action when applied to incidental burdens on religious exercise than has
resulted from application ofthis test to incidental burdens on speech and expression.62

parking ordinance which effectively prevented New Age religion from using traditional
gathering site); Hubbard v. Buffalo Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (W.D. Tex. 1998)
(upholding school district's policy of requiring students transferring from non-accredited
schools to take proficiency exams at their own expense, thereby burdening plaintiff's free
exercise rights, without considering whether the policy could have been implemented less
restrictively).
60. Stone, ContentRegulation,supranote 50, at 190 &n.5,222-24. Another commentator
goes even further, arguing that adequate communicative alternatives are always available in
symbolic speech cases. See William E. Lee, The Futile Search for Alternative Media in
Symbolic Speech Cases, 8 CoNST. COMMENTARY 451 (1991).
61.
[]n adapting a free speech test to free exercise jurisprudence, a problem
immediately arises-the concept of an alternative means of expression has no
obvious free exercise analogue ....
For example, the law challenged in O'Brien
merely made it more difficult for O'Brien to communicate his anti-war message
as effectively as he liked, whereas the law challenged in Smith made it
impossible for the Native Americans to engage in a required religious ritual.
DorJ supranote 38, at 1215 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); accordEisgruber &
Sager, supra note 5, at 1298 ("Religion does more than define the terms on which believers
may satisfy their interests; it actually constitutes their interests."); Laycock, supranote 9, at
21 ("A lower standard of review is more defensible in symbolic speech and time-place-andmanner cases; a restriction on a particular means or place ofexpression is unlikely to entirely
suppress a viewpoint in the way that a restriction on a particular means of worship can
entirely suppress a religious faith."); Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith:Religion, Equalityand
Speech in the US. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. Rnv. 739, 778 (1986) ("A free exercise claimant
...
cannot be truly satisfied with alternative outlets [for expression]. The free exercise claim
does not serve the instrumental purpose of reaching and persuading an audience; rather, it
serves the inner-directed purpose of living in accordance with one's beliefs.").
62. But see Dorf, supranote 38, at 1246 (observing that "[e]ven when a law has the effect
of rendering impossible the performance of a required religious act, we feel a strong pull
toward sustaining government power"). In addition, an alternatives inquiry might enmesh the
courts in a problematic inquiry into the "centrality" of a burdened practice to the claimant's
religious beliefs. Hernandezv. Commissioner,490 U.S. 680,699 (1989) ("It is not within the
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the
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Even in the context of incidental burdens on speech or expression, the Court often
exempts speakers from content- or viewpoint-neutral laws when it fears that such
laws effectively eliminate the possibilities for communication or otherwise silence the
speakers.63 Similarly, lower courts tend to invalidate conduct regulations under
O'Brien when such regulations are likely to foreclose completely the speaker's
communication of her message."

validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds.").
63. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (finding tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress without required showing of New York Times malice
unconstitutional as applied to parodies of public figures and public officials because of
potential chillling effect on political criticism); Brown v. Socialist Workers, 459 U.S. 87
(1982) (holding minority political party exempt from recipient and expenditure disclosure
statute because of potential chilling effect on affiliation with party and dissemination of its
unpopular ideas); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (finding municipal
ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment unconstitutional as applied to nude dancing for
failure to leave open adequate communicative alternatives); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (finding tort of libel per se without required showing of malice
unconstitutional as applied to criticism of government officials because of potential chilling
effect on such criticism); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (finding regulation barring
solicitation of legal business unconstitutional as applied to NAACP because of potential
chilling effect on discussion and institution of expressive litigation); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958) (finding production order issued in connection with litigation over
qualification of NAACP to do business in state unconstitutional to extent it required
disclosure ofmembers within the state, because ofpotential chilling effect on affiliation with
NAACP); see also Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions,supra note 50, at 114:

The general presumption is that incidental restrictions do not raise a question
of first amendment review. The presumption is waived, however, whenever an
incidental restriction either has a highly disproportionate impact on free
expression or directly penalizes expressive activity. And the latter exception is
applied quite liberally whenever the challenged restriction significantly limits
the opportunities for free expression.
This presumption seems not to hold true, however, in case of incidental restrictions on rights
under the Press Clause. See Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as
a Remedy for Invasions ofPrivacy, 43 BuFF.L. REv. 1, 78 (1995) (arguing that Cohen v.

Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), which holds that the First Amendment does not
insulate newspaper from liability on theory of promissory estoppel, exhibits a
"troubling... refusal to recognize the impact that neutral laws have on communication").
64. See, e.g., Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1039-41
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding total ban on begging unconstitutional under both O'Brienand time,
place, or manner decisions because it cut off "all means of allowing beggars to communicate
their message of solicitation"); Abney v. United States, 451 A.2d 78, 84-85 (D.C. App. 1982)
(holding ordinance prohibiting sleeping on grounds of U.S. Capitol unconstitutional under
O'Brien as applied to veteran protesting denial of benefits because veteran's "sleeping was
an integral part of and necessary to" his protest, and there was no evidence "showing
alternative means available.., for the continued exercise of his rights").
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II. DEVIANCE AND THE PERMISSIVE ACCOMMODATION RULE:
STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR BENIGN USE OF
SUSPECT CLASSIFYING TRAITS

A. "Benign" Racial DiscriminationUnder the
Equal ProtectionClause
The bulk of equal protection doctrine focuses directly on the classifying trait in
determining whether a classification is constitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause. In the standard model of equal protection analysis, a classification scheme
is upheld under the Equal Protection Clause so long as there is a rational basis for
it-that is, if there is any conceivable government goal that might be at least
marginally advanced by distinctions based on the trait.65 The goal ofthe classification
need not be important, only legitimate, and the classification may be a highly
inefficient means of achieving the goal-that is, it may be substantially over- or
underinclusive." So long as the classification bears some relationship, however
attenuated, to a legitimate government goal, however unimportant, it will be upheld.
Certain bases of classification are considered suspicious because they are highly
improbable means of achieving any legitimate government goal.' For example,
classifications which disadvantage individuals based upon their race are virtually
always motivated by animus towards the disadvantaged racial group rather than by
any government goal unrelated to race.' A second model ofequal protection doctrine
thus subjects racial and other such "suspect" classifications to strictjudicial scrutiny.
To withstand constitutional challenge, the goal of a suspect classification must be
"compelling," notjust legitimate, and the classification itself must be closely, notjust
conceivably, related to this compelling goal-that is, necessary or "precisely tailored"
to achieving it.6 Virtually all suspect classifications are found to violate the Equal
Protection Clause when subjected to strict scrutiny. 0
Although the doctrinal hostility to racial classifications under the Equal Protection
Clause is well established,7" the standard of review for so-called "benign" or
"remedial" racial classifications was only recently clarified. In contrast to invidious
racial discrimination, whose premise is the inferiority of the racial class that is
disadvantaged by the classification, benign or remedial racial classifications are

65. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-27 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10
(1949)..
66. See, e.g., Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489; Railway Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 110.
67. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
68. See Larry G. Simon, Racially PrejudicedGovernmentalActions: A Motivational
15 SANDiEGoL.REv. 1041,
Theoryofthe ConstitutionalBanAgainstRacialDiscrimination,
1051 (1978).
69. E.g., Plyler,457 U.S. at 214.
70. See Gunther, supranote 39, at 8 (stating that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but
fatal in fact").
71. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1879).
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premised on the government's desire to assist the racial class. After the issue first
arose in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,' several Justices
consistently maintained that benign racial classifications are subject only to
intermediate scrutiny-that is, such classifications do notviolate the Equal Protection
Clause if they are "substantially related" to an "important" government goal.'
Although in 1989 a majority of the Justices apparently held that benign racial
classifications by state governments are subject to strict scrutiny, 74 the very next term
the Court held that use of such classifications by the federal government triggered
only intermediate scrutiny.75 Not until 1995 did the Court unambiguously hold that
benign and remedial as well as invidious racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny regardless of the state or federal character of the government actor.76 As in
review of invidious racial classifications, the Court's application of strict scrutiny to
benign racial classifications seems tantamount to an announcement that the
classification is constitutionally invalid, although the Court insists that this will not
always be the case.'
B. Invidious Religious Discriminationand
PermissiveReligious Accommodation
Underthe Religion Clauses
The Strict Scrutiny Exception requires, inter alia, that government action that is
not "religiously neutral" be strictly scrutinized by the courts.' A law is neutral with

72.438 U.S. 265 (1978).
73. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,301-02 (1986) (Marshall, J.,joined
by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518-19
(1980) (Marshall, J.,joined by Brennan &Blackmun, JJ., concurring inthe judgment); Bakke,
438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
74. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality
opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & White & Kennedy, JJ.); id. at 520
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I agree... with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that
strict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classification by race, whether or not its
asserted purpose is 'remedial' or 'benign."').
75. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990).
76. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overrulingMetro
Broad., 497 U.S. at 547) ("[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.").
77. See Adarand,515 U.S. at 237 (disavowing that "strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but
fatal in fact,"' and suggesting that "'pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory
conduct"' might justify remedial racial classifications) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.)); see also Michael J. Perry,
Modem Equal Protection:A Conceptualizationand Appraisal,79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023,
1045 (1979) (arguing that benign racial preferences that satisfy intermediate scrutiny should
satisfy strict scrutiny as well).
78. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
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respect to religion if it does not use religion as a basis of classification-that is, ifthe
religious character of the beliefs and practices of those to whom a law applies is
irrelevant to the goals of its classification scheme.79 The Establishment Clause
generally prevents the government from singling out a particular religion for
disadvantageous treatment;-, Lukumi unanimously held thatthe Free Exercise Clause
also prohibits such treatment."
The constitutional implications of government action that disadvantages "religion
generally"-as opposed to a particular religion-are more complicated. For many
years certain interactions between government and religion were thought to be
violations of the Establishment Clause,' particularly when financial aid was
involved.' In this context, special protection for religion in the form of religious
exemptions seemed a permissible way to balance the special restrictions imposed
upon religion under the Establishment Clause.'
This balancing justification for religious exemptions has largely disappeared over
the last twenty or so years as the Court has transformed the Establishment Clause
from a structural guarantee of freedom from noncoercive government influence in

(1993).
79. See

PHmrp KURLAND, RELIuGION AND Tma LAW: OF CmmcHiAND STATE AND

TBE

SUPREME COURT 17-18 (1962).

80. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246, 247 (1982) (finding statute which
subjected only certain minority religions to fund raising registration and reporting
requirements to be suspect denominationalpreference under the Establishment Clause which
must be "closely fitted" to furthering a "compelling governmental interest"); see also
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that the Establishment Clause prohibits government from using religion "as a basis
of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits").
81. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547.
82. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating state-mandated posting
of Ten Commandments in public schools); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(invalidating state statute which prohibited the teaching of evolution in public schools);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating organized prayer and Bible
reading in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating use of stateauthored prayer in public schools); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
(invalidating religious instruction in public school classrooms during school day). See
generally Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1995)
("[C]ompliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to
justify content-based restrictions on speech.").
83. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating state-sponsored
enrichment and adult-education classes at private sectarian schools), overruled,Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1997); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (invalidating
federally sponsored assistance to educationally handicapped at private sectarian schools),
overruled,Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,235-36 (1997); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
84. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance ofthe Religion Clauses, 102 YALE
L.J. 1611 (1993); see also Kent Greenawalt Quo Vadis: The StatusandProspectsof "Tests "
Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 340-41 ("[A]ccommodation to those
beliefs and practices may be appropriate because the Establishment Clause places particular
limitations on assistance to religion that it does not extend to other beliefs and practices.").
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favor of religion, into an equality right requiring equal treatment of religious sects,
and of religion and nonreligion.8 5 The Court has held that so long as government
satisfies this equality rule, the Establishment Clause does not require that private
religious speakers be excluded from public forums,' that government categorically
refrain from using religious symbols,87 or that religious individuals be excluded from
receiving social welfare benefits for which they otherwise qualify.' The Court has
even approved subsidies paid directly to religious organizations when this equality
rule has required it.'
At present, there remain only a few areas in which the Establishment Clause
imposes special disabilities on religion which might provide a justification for
exemptions. These include prohibitions on government encouragement of or
participation in religious worship," on the delegation of governmental authority to
religious organizations,9 and on laws wholly lacking a plausible secular purpose.'
The relaxation of special restrictions on religion has also been accompanied by
increased scrutiny of permissive accommodations of religion. Although in 1987 the
Court upheld a statutory exemption of nonprofit religious groups from the
antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII, it has more recently invalidated two state
legislative exemptions defined in terms of religion.94 Professor Lupu has suggested
that the Title VII exemption is distinguishable from the other two exemptions
because it is necessary "to equalize religious entities with nonreligious entities that
95
face no comparable statutory impediment to hiring those with ideological loyalty."
In short, legislative exemptions defined in terms of religion are nowjustifiable only
in the relatively narrow range of cases in which religion suffers from special

85. See Gedicks, supranote 5, at 568-72.
86. See CapitolSquare, 515 U.S. at 753; Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see also Board of
Educ. v Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of Equal Access Act).
87. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668 (1984).
88. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,236 (1997) (overruling School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985), andAguilar,473 U.S. 402 (1985)); Zobrest v. Catalina Hills Sch. Dist, 509
U.S. 1, 8 (1993); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,609 (1988); Witters v. WashingtonDep't
of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393
(1983).
89. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
90. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
91. See Board ofEduc. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994);
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
92. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
93. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
94. See Kiryas Joel,512 U.S. at 687 (1994); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1
(1989); see also Estate of Thornton v. Calder, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating state statute
mandating that employees be excused from working on their Sabbath).
95. Lupu, supranote 8, at 809.
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Establishment Clause or other unique disadvantages. Since in these areas religious
organizations and individuals carry specialburdens not imposed on similarly situated
secular organizations and individuals, it does not violate constitutional equality
principles for the legislature to provide special relief to religion from other, related
burdens if it so chooses.
C. Permissive Religious Accommodation and the
"Normal" Standardof Review

Wholly apart from the religion clauses, religion has long been considered an
illegitimate basis of government classification under the Equal Protection Clause.
Suspicion of government action that discriminates against particular religious
denominations is rooted in the very origins of modem equal protection doctrine. 6
Contemporary decisions continue to group religious traits with racial ones as
examples of inherently "suspect" or "arbitrary" bases of classification to which the
presumption of constitutionality does not attach, 7 and for good reason. As Dean
Choper has pointed out, "both traits have been the strikingly similar objects ofpublic
(and private) stereotyping, stigma, subordination, and persecution.""8

96. See, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1950) (holding that denial of
Jehovah's Witnesses' application to use city park because of government distaste for
Witnesses' beliefs violated the "right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those
freedoms of speech and religionprotected by the First and FourteenthAmendments"); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that a"presumption
ofconstitutionality" should not attach to "statutes directed at particular religions"); American
Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900) (suggesting that tax exemptions drawn
on the basis of "color, race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations or other
considerations having no possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers" are
"purely arbitrary, oppressive or capricious" and deny "the equal protection of the laws to the
less favored classes").
97. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464-65 (1996); Millerv. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992); Wade
v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8
(1987); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,17 (1979); NewOrleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,303
(1976) (unanimous decision); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456 (1962); see also KiryasJoel,
512 U.S. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Government] may not segregate people on
account of their race, [as] it may not segregate on the basis of religion."); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12,17 (1956) (plurality opinion by Black, J.) ("In criminal trials a State cannomore
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.").
98. JESsE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINciPrs FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATON OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 42 (1995); see also Greenawalt,supranote 84,

at 349 ("[G]uarantees of religious rights are largely guarantees for minorities, and may be
justified as an aspect of equal protection.") (emphasis in original); David E. Steinberg,
Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77, 117 (1991) ("Like racial
classifications, religious classifications may seem inherently distasteful ... ."); Eugene
Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ET-Ics & PuB. PoL'Y
341, 371 (1999) ("The Equal Protection Clause asserts that certain traits, including religion
and, I believe, religiosity, should not be bases for governmental classifications.").
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Although classifications that assist religion have not traditionally been thought to
raise constitutional issues outside of the Establishment Clause, the new equal
protection doctrine that subjects even benign racial classifications to strict scrutiny
suggests that religiously defined legislative exemptions violate the Equal Protection
Clause, at least when they do not compensate for an Establishment Clause or other
special disability. In other words, a genuinely normal free exercise doctrine would
prohibit most legislatively mandated religious exemptions along with judicially
mandated ones.
Religious exemptions are a kind of benign suspect classification analogous to the
benign racial classifications recently struck down by the Court: individuals are
classified on the basis of religion, not to discriminate against them or otherwise to
disadvantage them, but in order to extend a benefit to them-exemption of the
religious class from compliance with an otherwise applicable and legitimate law."
Several commentators have attempted to distinguish benign use of racial
classifications from permissive religions accommodations. In contrast to private
racial discrimination, it is argued, private religious discrimination has been tolerated
and even encouraged by government.'
Whereas the goal of race-based
decisionmaking has been to eradicate racial difference, the goal of religious
exemptions has been to preserve religious difference.' And even if the Equal
Protection Clause requires "colorblindness," it does not require "religion blindness,"
because the Free Exercise Clause specifies a domain of preferred liberty for religious
activities that is not specified for other activities (and particularly not for racism)."
These arguments beg the questions at issue. It is unclear how traditional
government toleration of religious exemptions distinguishes itself from the nowabandoned toleration of benign racial classifications. The fact that government long
suffered and even encouraged unconstitutional behavior is no justification for
perpetuating it.0" It is equally unclear why the preservation of religious difference is
99. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes about Equality, 96 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 67 (1996); Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and CulturalIdentity: Reconciling the
Jurisprudenceof Race and Religion, 73 IND. L.J. 119, 162 (1997); see also Volokh, supra

note 38, at 1492-93 ("Any regime of religiousexemptions by definition prefers those whose
actions are motivated by religion over those whose identical actions are motivated by equally
deeply held secular beliefs.") (emphasis in original).
Indeed, in one respect religious exemptions are even more suspicious than benign racial
classifications under Adarandand Croson:because religious exemptions are rarely enacted
on evidence of intentional discrimination against religious individuals, they are almost never
remedial. See Lupu, supra note 8, at 814; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
518-20 (1997) (observing that legislative record for RFRA did not include findings that
religiously neutral and generally applicable laws masked discriminatory intent).
100. Thomas C. Berg, Religion,Race, Segregation,andDistricting:ComparingKiryas Joel
with Shaw/Miller, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 365, 375-76 (1996); Jesse H. Choper,Religion andRace
under the Constitution:Similarities and Differences, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 501, 504
(1994).
101. See Berg, supra note 100, at 377-78; Greene, supranote 99, at 68; Yang, supra note
99, at 179.
102. Berg, supra note 100, at 366, 377.
103. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
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a more worthy goal calling for less searching judicial scrutiny than eradication or
remediation of the lingering effects of slavery and invidious racial discrimination
generally.
Finally, it remains unclear why the ambiguous text of the Free Exercise Clause
does not mandate "religion blindness" when the equally ambiguous text ofthe Equal
Protection Clause is deemed to require the conceptually analogous rule of "color
blindness." Under the Smith doctrine, the domain of liberty marked by the Free
Exercise Clause consists of the right to remain free of intentional government
discrimination on the basis of religion,"'"just as one's rights under the Equal
Protection Clause now consist principally of the right to remain free of intentional
government discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and other such
characteristics. If the latter right prohibits use of a suspect category like race for
benign or remedial purposes, it is difficult to discern why benign or remedial use of
another suspect category like religion is not likewise prohibited.
The commentators also argue questionable factual premises. In contrast to the
stigma that attaches to the beneficiaries of benign racial classifications, it is argued,
no religious offense is given by religious exemptions. 5 It is also argued that whereas
racial preferences are a zero-sum game that penalize innocent whites for every racial
10 6
minority they assist, religious exemptions do not burden innocent third parties.
Neither premise is without controversy. Religious exemptions often impose costs on
others,'07 and it is far from clear that those with secular commitments that are morally
comparable to religious belief do not resent that they are not excused along with
believers from complying with burdensome laws.' 08
But even if these premises are correct, they are beside the point. Although in both
Adarand and Croson the Court adverted to the likelihood that benign or remedial
racial classifications stigmatize racial minorities," ° it ultimately did not rest its

104. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990).
105. See Berg, supranote 100, at 380; CHOPER, supra note 98, at 502.
106. See CHoPER, supranote 98, at 505; Greene, supranote 99, at 69-70.
107. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Calder, 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); see also Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the
Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 CoLuM. L. REv. 104, 115 (1996) ('Religious accommodations
usually create externalities, in the sense that such accommodations pennit behavior whichthe
polity would otherwise forbid; because the underlying prohibition usually has social benefits,
accommodations generate corresponding social costs."); Gary J. Simson, Laws Intentionally
FavoringMainstreamReligions:An Unhelpful Comparisonto Race, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
514, 520 (suggesting religious exemptions and other government encouragements ofreligion
inflict "a feeling of second-class citizenship on people who adhere either to religions other
than the favored one or to no religion at all").
108. See Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The
Fragmentationand SynthesisofReligion, Equality, andSpeech in the Constitution,51 OHio
ST. L.J. 89, 144 (1990); Gedicks, supranote 5, at 562-63; see also Steinberg, supranote 98,
at 131 n.318 ("Judicial and legislative exemptions raise the same establishment clause
problem because they both confer a unique benefit on specified religions.").
109. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989), cited with
approvalin Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (plurality opinion); see
also id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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decision in either case on a theory of racial stigma.' 10 According to the Court, the
principal constitutional harm of racial classifications lies in the fact that such
classifications grant or deprive opportunities on the basis of a trait that is irrelevant
to one's personal worth, and are thus virtually per se invalid,"' as the commentators
themselves acknowledge."'
Of course, there is no denying that in late twentieth-century America religious
accommodation by government is simply not perceived to be as offensive or as
invidious as government mandated racial preference."' This may be because, the
Smith doctrine notwithstanding, American society places a higher value on religious
liberty than on racial solidarity." 4 It may also be because religious discrimination is
simply not viewed as the deeply rooted, widespread, and intractable problem that
racial discrimination seems to be.
Nevertheless, however one distinguishes benign racial discrimination and
permissive religious accommodation, both practices classify on the basis of a suspect

110. Cf. Simon, supra note 68, at 1068-70 (arguing that racially prejudiced government
actions insult, stigmatize, and demean the dignity of those toward whom the prejudice is
held).
111. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30; id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 494; id. at 520-21 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
112. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 100, at 369, 371 (stating that the "correctness" of the
Court's racial redistricting cases turns on whether the Equal Protection Clause is largely a
requirement of "color blindness," incorporating "a strong principle of race-blindness across
the board"); Greene, supranote 99.
On the Court's view as set forth inAdarandand Croson, people of different
races should always be treated the same, and the fact that the races have not
been treated equally, and that the government may at times seek to acknowledge
that fact through providing benefits for the hitherto maltreated racial minorities,
becomes irrelevant....
Thus, despite a wealth of writing explaining that laws benefiting African
Americans are justified although laws benefiting whites are not, the Court
increasingly has stuck to a "color-blind" jurisprudence, insisting on treating all
race-based laws the same.
Id. at 65 (footnote omitted).
113. See, e.g., Lupu, supranote 107, at 115 (arguing thatreligious accommodations are less
likely to undermine "the ethic of meritocracy and thereby to generate resentment").
114. Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,469-70 (1973) ("[A]lthough the Constitution
does not proscribe private bias, it places no value on discrimination as it does on the values
inherent in the Free Exercise Clause."); Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion
Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values-A CriticalAnalysis of
"NeutralityTheory" andCharitableChoice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETMIcs &PUB. PoL'Y 243,
264 (1999):
Except for limited remedial exceptions, no state or private institutional interest
in taking race into account in civil life receives or deserves respect today.
Religion and religious differences are more complicated. At least in the private
sector, it is not at all problematic for people of a particular faith to gather
together and establish a house ofworship or school that is exclusively sectarian
in operation and membership. Indeed, many of us would affirm such activities
as a positive and good thing.
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trait-race, religion-in order to accomplish a socially desirable result-enhancing
minority opportunities by correcting for the corrosive effects of past or present
racism, enhancing religious freedom by insulating religious practices from
burdensome laws. Thus, the question remains whether the perception that religious
discrimination is somehow less offensive or invidious justifies use ofa legislative tool
for alleviating burdens on religious exercise when that same tool is denied to those
who wish to mitigate the undeniable and continuing effects of racial discrimination.
If benign or remedial racial classifications are not justified by the United States'
centuries-long institutionalization and protection of African-American slavery, and
the abundant historical evidence of long, persistent, and widespread government
discrimination against African-Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities, it
is hard to imagine how religious exemptions are to be justified." 5 Many religious
minorities have suffered serious and violent persecution in the United States, but
none of them have suffered worse than African-Americans. "6 Despite its pretensions
to normality, the Permissive Accommodation Rule of the Smith doctrine stands in
stark contrast to the Court's decisions prohibiting the use of suspect racial
classifications, even for benign or remedial purposes. If free exercise doctrine were
truly normal, its abandonment of judicial exemptions in Smith would have been
matched by invalidation of legislative exemptions defined in terms of religion.

115. See Volokh, supranote 38, at 1533 ("[I]four concern [underthe Free Exercise Clause]
is preventing intentional discrimination, I see no reasonwhy the Court should adopt a stronger
prophylactic rule to prevent religious discrimination than it has forrace or sex discrimination,
where it requires evidence ofactual discriminatory intent despite the difficulty of getting such
evidence."); see also John E. Sanchez, ReligiousAffirmative Action in Employment: Fearfid
Symmetry, 1991 DET. C. L. REy. 1019, 1067-68 (noting that in contrast to those asserting
claims for race or gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, religious
claimants prior to Smith were not required to prove discriminatory intent).
Professor Perry argues in this Symposium that even if the Free Exercise Clause is
understood to constitutionalize only an antidiscriminationnorm, the clause wouldnevertheless
prevent the government from prohibiting conduct simply because the government is "hostile"
or "indifferent" to religious groups for whom the prohibited conduct is a religious practice.
Michael J. Perry, Freedom ofReligion in the UnitedStates: Fin de Si6cle Sketches, 75 IND.
L.J. 295 (2000). Acknowledging the proof problems inherent in this reading of the clause,
Perry creatively argues that hostility or indifference could be proved indirectly, by means of
a presumption that government-imposed burdens on religious practice are the result of
hostility or indifference whenever the government refuses to exempt the religious practice
from the burden even though such an exemption would not seriously compromise any
important government objective. Id. at 303. As I have argued, however, the government
violates the religious antidiscrimination norm rooted in the Equal Protection Clause when it
exempts religiously motivated conduct from otherwise legitimate laws, but does not exempt
comparable secularly motivated conduct, for such an exemption necessarily creates a suspect
religious classification. Perry does not explain why the free exercise antidiscrimination norm
should trump the equal protection antidiscrimination norm. Exemptions from burdensome
conduct are consistent with the antidiscrimination norms ofboth the Free Exercise Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause only when they exempt both religious conduct and comparable
secular conduct
116. See Gedicks, supra note 5, at 566; Lupu, supra note 107, at 114.
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IV. DEVIANCE AND THE STRICT SCRUTINY EXCEPTION:
STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR
UNDERINCLUSIVE CLASSIFICATIONS

A. The FundamentalRights/EqualProtectionDoctrine
and the Problem ofLegislative Underinclusion
One of the earliest problems in American constitutional jurisprudence was the
legitimacy of laws that exempted particular individuals or classes of people from the
burdens of a law, or focused their benefits on such individuals or classes." 7 During
the nineteenth century, it was thought that the best protections against government
oppression were the dual requirements that legislative majorities impose the same
legal burdens on themselves that they imposed on minorities, and that legal benefits
be provided to minorities on the same basis as they are to majorities."'
Underinclusive laws-those that permitted the selective imposition of burdens on or
distribution of benefits to particular individuals or classes--constituted
unconstitutional "class legislation.""' Such selectivity was pernitted only when
found to advance a "public interest."' 20 The distinction between "private" and

117. See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CoNsTITUnONBESEIGED: THERISE ANDDEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 30 (1993) (observing that according to
"Madison and his allies" at Philadelphia, "the use of public power to advance the interests
of one class at the expense of a competing class was to be considered the most vivid and
authoritative example of illegitimate and unrepublican government"); Melissa L. Saunders,
EqualProtection,ClassLegislation,and Colorblindness,96 MICH. L. REV. 245,256 (1997)
('%Iadison expressed the prevailing sentiment ofthe founding generation when he said that
the state should be 'neutral between different parts of Society,' that 'equality ought to be the
basis of every law,' and that the law should not subject some persons to 'peculiar burdens'
or grant others 'peculiar exemptions."' (quoting Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 24,
1787), reprintedin JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (1785))).

118. See GIL.MAN, supranote 117, at 54; Saunders, supranote 117, at255 (citingErvine's
Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 268 (1851); Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn- (1 Yer.) 599, 606
(Spec. Ct at Nashville 1831) (Green, J.) ("[T]he minority are safe.... [if] the majority, who
make the law, are operated on by it equally with the others.")).
119. EDWARD S. CORWIN, AMERICAN CONSTrrunONAL HISTORY 82 (Alpheus T. Mason &
Gerald Garvey eds., 1964); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
PO~ITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 177 (1988); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISEONTECONSTITTIONALLIMrTATIONSWHICHRESTUPONTHELEGISLATIVEPOWER

OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 390-91 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868) ("But

a statute would not be constitutional which should prescribe a class or a party for opinion's
sake, or which should select particular individuals from a class or locality, and subject them
to peculiar rules or impose upon them special obligations or burdens from which others in the
same locality or class are exempt.").
120. GILLMAN, supranote 117, at 29, 49-50; NELSON, supranote 119, at 192-93; Saunders,

supranote 117, at 260-61, 308; see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 88
(1872) (Field, J., dissenting) ("The grant, with exclusive privileges, of a right thus
appertaining to the government [i.e., of a public character, like a toll bridge], is a very
different thing from a grant, with exclusive privileges, of a right to pursue one ofthe ordinary
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"public" purposes proved hopelessly controversial, however, resulting in judicial
abandonment of the doctrine against class legislation during the New Deal.'
Contemporary doctrine has reversed the old presumptions. Whereas the doctrine
against class legislation entailed a presumption against underinclusiveness,
permitting it only when it served a public interest, contemporary equal protection
doctrine presupposes the constitutionality of underinclusive classifications,
invalidating them only when they are defined by a suspect criterion or burden a
"fundamental" right or interest.'
Having already discussed the former
circumstance,lu I turn now to the latter.
1. Development of the Fundamental Rights/Equal
Protection Doctrine
In contrast to the minimal and heightened scrutiny models of equal protection
doctrine, the "fundamental rights" model focuses on the conduct burdened by a
classification rather than on the classifying trait: even when the classifying trait is not
suspect, strict scrutiny is called for if the classification burdens the exercise of a
fundamental right or interest held by members of the class defined by the trait. 124

trades or callings of life, which is a right appertaining solely to the individual."); CooLEY,
supranote 119, at 357 ("[Tjhere is no rule or principle known to our system under which
private property can be taken from one man and transferred to another for the private use and
benefit of such other person, whether by general laws or by special enactment. The purpose
must be public, and must have reference to the needs of government.").
121. Saunders, supra note 117, at 261-62; see Mark C. Yudof, EqualProtection,Class
Legislation, and Sex Discrimination:One Small Cheerfor Mr. HerbertSpencer's Social
Statics, 88 MiCH. L. REV. 1366, 1377-78, 1386 (1990).
122. E.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("Unless a
classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect
distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of
the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest"); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 312 (1976) ("[E]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative
classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.") (footnote
omitted). See generally GULMAN, supranote 117, at 54 (emphasis in original):
Just as modem courts have had to develop a theory of preferredfreedoms in
order to identify which important liberties the government should not touch
without a really good reason, nineteenth-century jurists had to develop a
jurisprudence of publicpurpose that would be useful in distinguishing general
from partial laws and laws that treated people differently forjustifiable reasons
("reasonable" laws) from laws that treated people differently for unjustifiable
reasons ("unreasonable" laws). Unlike the emphasis on "balancing" which is so
much a part of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, this nineteenthcentury approach to legislative power was essentially categorical-laws either
promoted public welfare or were arbitrary and unreasonable.
123. See supra Part IELA.
124. See Perry, supra note 77, at 1077 ("What is disfavored [under the fundamental
rights/equal protection doctrine] is not the basis of the classification (i.e., the trait or other
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Fundamental rights/equal protection doctrine has its roots in Skinner v.
Oklahoma.' Skinner involved a constitutional challenge to a state law which
provided for sterilization of "habitual criminals," defined as those who had three or
more felony convictions and were imprisoned for the latest conviction. 26 However,
the law did not count certain nonviolent felonies, such as embezzlement, for purposes
of determining whether a criminal was "habitual" within the meaning of the law,
even though state law otherwise treated nonviolent felonies as the same kind of
offense as violent felonies like burglary and larceny.' Although the degree of
violence implied or involved in the commission ofa felony is not a suspect classifying
trait, the Court nevertheless subjected the law to strict scrutiny because the
consequence of the state's use of this nonsuspect classification was to deprive some
three-time felons, but not others, of the fundamental right to conceive offspring."
The Court applies this same analysis to infringements on the right to travel. In the
leading case of Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court declared the "right to travel
interstate" fundamental, even though it appears nowhere in the constitutional text'
The Court then applied strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to a oneyear residency requirement for receipt of state welfare benefits, holding it an
unconstitutional burden on the right to travel.'30
Shapiro was broadly criticized as an effort by the Court to return to the close,
substantive review of economic and social legislation that had characterized the
much-maligned Lochner era.' 3' Less than a year later the Court retreated from the

factor in terms ofwhich the class is defined) but its effect (preventing or impeding satisfaction
of a fundamental interest).") (emphasis in original); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
216-17 (1982) (treating as "presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage
a 'suspect class,' or that impinge upon the exercise of a 'fundamental right.' With respect to
such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring
the State to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.").
125. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
126. Id. at 536-37.
127. Id. at 537.
128. See id. at 535; see also id. at 542 ("In terms of fines and imprisonment, the crimes of
larceny and embezzlement rate the same under the Oklahoma code. Only when it comes to
sterilization are the pains and penalties of the law different.").
In addition to "fundamental," the Court also described the right to conceive offspring as
"basic to the perpetuation of a race," "one of the basic civil rights of man," and "a basic
liberty." Id. at 536, 541.
129. 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 & n.8 (1969). Justice Harlan agreed that the right to travel
interstate was fundamental, but located the right in the Due Process Clause and disputed that
it was materially burdened by durational residency requirements for welfare benefits. See id.
at 671-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 633-38.
131. See, e.g., id. at 662 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gary S. Goodpaster, The Constitutionand
FundamentalRights, 15 ARIz. L. REV.479,496 (1973); see also Ira C. Lupu, Untanglingthe
Strandsofthe FourteenthAmendment,77 MICH. L. REv. 981,993,996 (1979) ("Thelanguage
and relatively untroubled history ofthe equal protection clause combined to render acceptable
a species ofjudicial interventionism that, had it rested on the due process clause, would have
been intolerable."); J. Harvie Wilkinson II,The Supreme Court,the EqualProtectionClause,
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broadest implications of Shapiro, holding in Dandridgev. Williams that while an
individual's right to travel was fundamental, her interest in public welfare assistance
was not' 32
The death knell for recognizing additional unenumerated constitutional rights
through fundamental rights/equal protection analysis was sounded a few years later
by San Antonio School Districtv. Rodriguez. 33 As inDandridge,the Court declined
to find that wealth classifications are per se suspect.'3 More important, the Court
confined fundamental rights analysis to classifications that prevent or burden the
exercise of rights "explicitly or implicitly" guaranteed by the Constitution. 35 The
only unenumerated rights that the Court understood to be "implicitly" guaranteed by
the Constitution-and thus properly protected by fundamental rights analysis even
though not expressly enumerated-were the right to travel, the right to vote in state
elections, and the right to control one's procreative decisions."
Fundamental rights analysis is sometimes characterized as a Warren Court excess
rejected later by less activist Courts. 33 However, the Rehnquist Court has used
fundamental rights analysis to invalidate burdens on the right to travel, confirming
the continued vitality of this analysis even among political conservatives.'38 There is
nothing aberrational about fundamental rights analysis when it is used to protect
rights and interests expressly enumerated in the constitutional text or clearly implied
therefrom. 3 9 As Chief Justice Stone suggested more than sixty years ago, suspicious

and the Three FacesofConstitutionalEquality,61 VA. L. REV. 945, 1017 (1975) (criticizing
the Warren Court's equal protection doctrine for, inter alia, "its seemingly ad hoc elevation
of fundamental rights and values").
132. 397 U.S. 471,484-87 (1970).
133.411 U.S. 1 (1973).
134. See id. at 18-28.
135. Id. at 33-34. Following a review of its fundamental rights/equal protection cases, the
Court concluded:
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question now before the Court is
plain. It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to
discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to
subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is
as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether
there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Id.
136. Id. at 31-32, 33-34 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); see also id. at 34 nn.73-74 & 76 (discussing the right to
privacy and the right to vote). The Court recently reaffirmed the fundamental constitutional
status of the right to travel. See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1524 (1999) ("The word
'travel' is not found in the text of the Constitution. Yet the 'constitutional right to travel from
one State to another' is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.").
137. See, e.g., Lupu, supranote 131, at 997-98.
138. See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1530.

139. See, e.g., Lupu, supranote 131, at 1000-01 ("[The entire discussion of the Rodriguez
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governmental classifications that deserve strict judicial scrutiny include not only
those that disadvantage "discrete and insular minorities," but also those that prevent
or burden the exercise of rights expressly granted in the Bill of Rights or necessary
to the preservation of constitutional government.'40
2. The Fundamental Rights/Equal Protection Doctrine and
Legislative Underinclusion
Fundamental rights/equal protection analysis is principally concerned with
underinclusive legislative classifications. In the typical fundamental rights/equal
protection case, government has created a classification scheme that has the effect of
depriving some people, but not others, of a fundamental right or interest. 14' The
danger inherent in underinclusive classifications recalls the nineteenth-century
preoccupation with class legislation: underinclusive classifications allow majorities
to relieve themselves of the burden of complying with laws that burden their own
rights or interests, while leaving minorities subject to such burdens. 42 Since the
heightened scrutiny called for by fundamental rights analysis demands a close fit
between a compelling government goal and the challenged classification,
fundamental rights analysis guards against legislative majorities preferring their own
fundamental rights and interests through laws that selectively exempt majorityfavored classes from legal prohibitions that impact fundamental rights or interests,
or that disproportionately burden the fundamental rights and interests of disapproved
43
minorities. 1

"fundamental rights" claim proceeded on the articulated assumption that the fundamentality
of a right depends on its coincidence with textual or structural values."); see also Gunther,
supra note 39, at 24 ("The Burger Court is not likely to expand the list of [fundamental]
interests and [suspect] classifications significantly. But when classifications such as race or
interests such as speech are involved, tighter reins on the legislatures would remain
appropriate.").
140. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that
closer judicial scrutiny may be appropriate in case of legislation that "appears on its face to
be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution" or which "restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation').
141. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (invalidating city ordinance prohibiting
all demonstrations at a residence [other than one used as a place of employment] except
"peaceful labor picketing"); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92 (invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting
all demonstrations except site-related "peaceful labor picketing" within 150 feet of a school
in session); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating a school
district ordinance denying right to vote in school bond election to residents who do not own
property); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535 (invalidating a state law subjecting to punitive
sterilization of those convicted of three violent felonies, but not those convicted of three
nonviolent felonies).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
143. See Railway Express Agency, Inc., 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("The framers ofthe Constitution knew, and we should not forgettoday, thatthere
is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than
to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally."); LAuRENCEH. TRiBE, AMmCAN CONSTrruTioNALLAw § 16-6, at 1452
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Fundamental rights/equal protection analysis does not prohibit all classifications
that burden fundamental rights or interests. Rather, it prohibits only those
classifications in which the relationship between the exempted classes and the
purpose of the law cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the relationship of
classes burdened by the law to this purpose. Skinner,for example, held that "[w]hen
the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsicallythe same
quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive
treatmen" ' 44
Similarly, in Police Department v. Mosley, the Court considered a municipal
ordinance that prohibited picketing within 150 feet of a school while the school was
in session. 4 The purpose of the ordinance was to preserve the quiet and order
necessary for a proper learning environment."t However, the ordinance exempted
from its provisions "peaceful labor picketing" related to a bona fide labor dispute at
the school." The Court struck this exemption down, reasoning that the Equal
Protection Clause did not permit government to punish some kinds of speech and not
others when any sort of speech threatened the government's ostensible goal:
Although preventing school disruption is a city's legitimate concern, Chicago
itself has determined that peaceful labor picketing during school hours is not an
undue interference with school. Therefore, under the Equal Protection Clause,
Chicago may not maintain that other picketing disrupts the school unless that
picketing is clearly more disruptivethan the picketing Chicago alreadypermits.
... "Peaceful" nonlabor picketing... is obviously no more disruptive than
"peaceful" labor picketing.""

(2d ed. 1988) (noting that "there are very few cases which strictly scrutinize and yet uphold
instances of impaired fundamental rights"); see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (reviewing a state tax on ink and
paper imposed on only the largest one or two newspapers in the state):
When the State imposes a generally applicable tax, there is little cause for
concern. We need not fear that a government will destroy a selected group of
taxpayers by burdensome taxation ifit must impose the same burden on the rest
of its constituency. When the State singles out the press, though, the political
constraints that prevent a legislature from passing crippling taxes of general
applicability are weakened, and the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute.
144. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added); see also id. at 542 ("In terms of fines and
imprisonment, the crimes of larceny and embezzlement rate the same under the Oklahoma
code. Only when it comes to sterilization are the pains and penalties of the law different").
145.408 U.S. 92 (1972).
146. See id. at 99.
147. Id. at 100.
148. Id.(emphasis added); accordCarey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,465 (1980) ("[The state]
can point to nothing inherent in the nature of peaceful labor picketing that would make it any
less disruptive of residential privacy than peaceful picketing on issues of broader social
concern.").
AlthoughMosley and Careywere both decided under the Equal Protection Clause, contentbased underinclusion can be understood to violate either the Equal Protection Clause or the
Speech Clause. See NOWACK& ROTUNDA, supranote 33, § 14.40 at 941; TmBE,supranote
143, § 16-9, at 1459 & n.ll; Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of FirstAmendment
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Finally, Saenz v. Roe confirms that the Court continues to strike down
classifications that burden the exercise of fundamental rights when the government
cannot articulate a relevant difference between the class subject to the law and the
class exempt from the law.'49 Decided just last Term, Saenz involved an equal
protection challenge to a state statute which limited welfare benefits for newly arrived
residents during their first year of residence to the benefit such residents would have

Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based
Underinclusion, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 29, 39-40; cf, Carey, 447 U.S. at 471 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("The opinion of the Court in this case, as did the Court's opinion in [Mosley],
invokes the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis of decision.
But what was actually at stake in Mosely, and is at stake here, is the basic meaning of the
constitutional protection of free speech.") (citation omitted). On the one hand, if contentneutral regulation defimes a part of the liberty protected by the Free Speech Clause, then the
ordinance in Mosley directly intruded upon this liberty by punishing picketing in the vicinity
of schools based on whether such picketing related to a labor dispute or not.But contentbased underinclusion can also be framed as an equality issue. See Kagan,supra, at 39. On the
other hand, then, the Court may ask, not merely whether "[t]he government has a sufficient
reason for restricting the speech affected," but rather, "whether the government has a
sufficient reason for restricting the speech affected andnot restricting other expression." Id.
at 40 (emphasis in original); accordStone, Content Regulation,supra note 50, at 203 ("The
key issue [in underinclusion analysis] is not whether the restricted speech is sufficiently
harmfil tojustify its restriction, but whether the government may constitutionally restrict only
the speech restricted.") (emphasis added).
It matters whether underinclusive classifications that burden fundamental rights are
analyzed as violations of liberty or equality, for the latter analysis is less restrictive of
government options. Violations of liberty norms can be cured only by wholly repealing the
challenged government action. For example, ifMosley is analyzed as a liberty violation, then
even a comprehensive prohibition on picketing must be struck down as an unconstitutional
interference with the presumptive right to use streets and sidewalks for communicative
purposes. Violations of equality norms, by contrast, can sometimes be cured less drastically,
by merely eliminating the underinclusive effect of such action. See id. at 205. IfMosley is
analyzed as an equality violation, then the violation can be cured either by entirely repealing
any regulation of expression on streets and sidewalks in the vicinity of schools, or by
eliminating the exemption for site-related labor picketing-that is, by extending the
prohibition to all expression on streets and sidewalks within 150 feet of a school in session.
See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 n.13 (1975) (suggesting the
permissibility of a traffic regulation which required all drive-in movie theatres, as opposed
to only those showing movies containing nudity, to block their screens from the view of
motorists).
This option is not always available, however. While it may have been possible in the
immediate aftermath of Skinner-which, after all, was decided only fifteen years after Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state statute providing for sterilization ofthe mentally
disabled)-curing the underinclusion ofthe sterilization statute by extending the sterilization
penalty to all three-time felons is (fortunately) no longer a constitutionally viable alternative
today. See NOWACK &ROTUNDA, supranote 33, § 14.27, at 797-98 (stating that sterilization
statutes are now viewed as intrusions upon the fundamental right of reproductive autonomy
and must satisfy strict scrutiny).
149. 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999).
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received had they remained in the state from which they had moved." The Court
beganby expresslyreaffirmingboth the fundamental status oftheunenumerated right
to travel,' and Shapiro'sholding that classifications that burden the right to travel
are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.1 It went on to hold
that because there is no difference between the welfare needs of newly arrived state
residents and those of established residents who qualify for full benefits,
discriminating between the two in the distribution of benefits imposes an unjustified
penalty on the right to travel:
Neither the duration of respondents' [state] residence, nor the identity of their
prior States of residence, has any relevance to their need for benefits. Nor do
these factors bear any relationship to the State's interest in making an equitable
allocation ofthe funds to be distributed among its needy citizens .... In short, the

State's legitimate interest in saving money provides no justification for its
decision to discriminate among equally eligible citizens.'53

Legislative underinclusion does not normally present a constitutional issue; the
Equal Protection Clause generally permits states to proceed "one step at a time" in
addressing social problems and does not usually require that they solve all
dimensions of a problem, or none at all." Accordingly, in most cases one can easily
articulate a plausible rational basis for an underinclusive law, simply by describing
the law's effect. As one commentator has pointed out, "[tihe nature of the burdens or
benefits created by a statute and the nature of the chosen class's commonality will
always suggest a statutory purpose-to so burden or benefit the common trait shared
by members of the identified class."' 55
In Skinner, for example, one can imagine that the legislature considered violent
crimes more threatening to social order than nonviolent crimes, and sought to
provide extra deterrence of the former by sterilizing only those who habitually
committe&dviolent crimes. Similarly, the rational basis for the law in Mosley was
obviously to prevent disruption of public schools, except to the extent that such

150. Id. at 1521.
151. See id. at 1526 ("The word 'travel' is not found inthe text of the Constitution. Yet the
'constitutional right to travel from one State to another' is fimly embedded in our
jurisprudence.").
152. See id. at 1524 (discussing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)).

153. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. ("[The Equal Protection] Clause does not tolerate
a hierachy of 45 subclasses of similarlysituated citizens based on the location of their prior
residence.") (emphasis added).
Saenz caused a bit of a stir by also holding that the right of newly arrived state residents
to enjoy the same state government benefits as older residents is a privilege or immunity of

federal citizenship categorically protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
154. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus
tenBroek, The Equal Protectionofthe Laws, 37 CAL. L. RaV. 341, 348-49, 371-72 (1949).

155. LegislativePurpose,Rationality,andEqualProtection,supranote 57, at 128; see also
id. at 131 ("[l]f a burden or a benefit is placed on a group that shares a trait that can be
named, at least one purpose for doing so can always be to burden or benefit those that share
the trait.").
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prevention required restriction of labor picketing, a form of speech closely linked to
the labor union activity that has long been favored by American public policy. - And
in Saenz, the State argued that a reduced benefit for newly arrived residents saves
money, which it clearly does. 57
Thus, the heightened judicial scrutiny that fundamental rights/equal protection
analysis calls for when a fundamental right or interest is burdened is what makes the
doctrine important. Rationalizations which merely describe the effect of a
classification do not satisfy strict scrutiny. The state may favor or penalize particular
classes ofpeople by selectively imposing burdens or distributing benefits only so long
as doing so does not impact the exercise of a fundamental right or the enjoyment of
a fundamental interest. When government action interferes with such rights or
interests, it must satisfy a higher standard ofjustification; a bald desire to penalize
the exercise of a fundamental right or the enjoyment of a fundamental interest is not
available as ajustification." Instead, the government must explain why conduct that
undermines the ostensible purpose of a law is exempted from the law when similar
conduct remains subject to the law, or why conduct is excluded from benefits which
the law distributes when similar conduct is the recipient of such benefits.'59 In sum,

156. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466 (1980) (summarizing state's argument
that federal and state law has long given special protection to labor protests).
157. Saenz, 119 S.Ct. at 1523.
158. See id. at 1527-28 (stating that classifications between newly arrived and established
residents, and among newly arrived residents based on their state of origin, "may not be
justified by apurpose to deterwelfare applicants from migrating to California," because "such
a purpose would be unequivocally impermissible"); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982)
(holding that to justify discrimination with respect to an "important" interest, like access to
public education, "[t]he State must do more than justify its classification with a concise
explanation of an intention to discriminate"); see also Kagan, supranote 148, at 65 ("It is a
staple of First Amendment jurisprudence that no government action may be taken because
public officials disapprove of the message communicated. The flip side of this principle...
is that 'the government may not exempt expression from an otherwise general restriction
because it agrees withthe speaker's views."') (quoting Stone, ContentRegulation,supra note
50, at 228); Tussman & tenBroek, supranote 154, at 373 (stating that judicial deference to
legislative underinclusion should be "inoperative when the Court is dealing with human, civil
or individual rights"); id. at 350 ("[L]egislative submission to political pressure does not
constitute a fair reason for failure to extend the operation of a law to those similarly situated
whom it leaves untouched.").
159. See Saenz, 119 S. Ct. at 1527 (stating that tojustify reduced benefits for newly arrived
residents as a money-saving measure, the state must explain "why it is sound fiscal policy to
discriminate against those who have been citizens for less than a year."); Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975) ("'[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to
mention the First Amendment itself,' even a traffic regulation carmot discriminate on the
basis of content unless there are clear reasons for the distinctions." (quoting Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972))); cf.Perry, supranote 77, at 1068-69 &n.235 (arguing
that meaningful rationality review is "a demand for an answer-or, more accurately, as an
argument that there is no satisfactory answer-to the question, 'Why me but no one
else?'.. . If one is complaining about being excluded from a class on which a benefit is
conferred the question would be 'Why them but not me?"') (emphasis in original); accord
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 154, at 370 (stating that legislative underinclusion raises
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when a law infringes upon or burdens fundamental rights or interests, it may not
exempt from its coverage persons or activities that are not proved to be substantially
different than those persons or activities that remain subject to the law.
B. Underinclusiveness, GeneralApplicability,
and the Smith Doctrine
The Smith doctrine specifies that incidentalburdens imposed by a law on religious
practices are subject to rational basis scrutiny so long as the law is "generally
applicable." Although Smith itself did not define "general applicability," an ordinary
language interpretation of the term suggests that a generally applicable law is one
that applies to all or nearly all of'whom one would normally expect the law to apply,
given its purpose.
Lulumi defined general applicability differently, however. According to Lukumi,
general applicability is an additional prohibition on religious "targeting"-that is, a
prohibition against laws that pursue their secular objectives only against religious
conduct."60 Lukumi cited four decisions as authority for the proposition that the
general applicability of legislation is a familiar requirement of First Amendment
jurisprudence; these citations all suggest that the Court understands a generally
applicable law to be one that does not focus its burdens or benefits on a particular
class to the exclusion of most others that are similarly situated.""

"the problem ofjustifying the exclusion fromthe regulation ofpersons and activities similarly
situated but left untouched").
160. See, e.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524 ("[T]he principle of general applicability was
violated because the secular ends asserted in defense of the [challenged] laws were pursued
only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs."); see also id. at 543
("[G]overmment, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief. . . ."); id. at 545 ("[E]ach off-ialeah's
ordinances pursues the city's governmental interests only against conduct motivated by
religious belief. The ordinances 'ha[ve] every appearance of a prohibition that society is
prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not upon itself."') (quoting and
paraphrasing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment)).
161.Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, 501 U.S. 663,66970 (1991) (holding that state doctrine of promissory estoppel sought to be applied against a
newspaper reporter is "a law of general applicability" because "[i]t does not target or single
out the press," but "is generally applicable to... all the citizens" of the state) (emphasis
added); see University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189-91, 200-01 (1990) (finding that
certain amendments to Title VII constitute generally applicable laws because they "do not
carve out any special privilege" for nondisclosure of tenure files and other peer review
material by colleges and universities); Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Commissioner of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (invalidating state tax which had the effect of collecting
the vast majority of its revenue from one or two newspapers; because state had "singled out
the press" for special treatment rather than applying the tax to all the constituents of the
taxing jurisdiction); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (holding
that church property disputes are justiciable under the Establishment Clause when they can
be resolved by reference to "neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property
disputes," as opposed to resolution by the particular doctrines or customs of a religious
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Lukumi explained that religious targeting and general applicability are mutually
reinforcing tests: A law that religiously targets is usually not generally applicable,
and vice versa. 62 Although it hints at the possibility of a broader reading of general
applicability,'63 Lukumi generally characterizes both religious neutrality and general
applicability as tests that guard against the selective imposition of burdens on
religiously motivated conduct.'"
In sum, under the Smith doctrine, a religiously neutral law does not fail the test of
general applicability merely by being modestly or even substantially underinclusive;
rather, the law must be so dramatically underinclusive that religious conduct is
virtually the only conduct to which the law applies. The Court will tolerate a
tremendous amount of underinclusion before finding that a law is not generally
applicable, so long as the underinclusion stops short of religious targeting.'65

organization) (emphasis added).
162. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
163. See id. at 542 ("All laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are
ofparamount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice.");
id.at 543 ("The ordinances are underinclusive for th[e] ends [of protecting public health and
preventing animal cruelty]. They fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these
interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does. The underinclusion is
substantial, not inconsequential.").
164. Id. at 531, 543.
165.
In my view, the defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to those laws that
by theirterms impose disabilities on the basis ofreligion; whereas the defect of
lack of general applicability applies primarily to those laws which, though
neutral in their terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement target
the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory treatment.
Id. at 557 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original); cf Lucas v. North Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072,
1074 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("We have... in our takings law frequently looked to
the generality of a regulation of property. [C]ourts have long recognized the difference
between a regulation that targets one or two parcels of land and a regulation that enforces a
statewide policy.") (emphasis in original); Gilles, supranote 63, at 70 (arguing that Cohen
defines a "generally applicable" law in the context of burdens on speech rights of the press
as a law that (1) does not "target the press,"(2) does not "target a particular message," and
(3) is "aimed at nonspeech").
In Minnesota Star, for example, the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to a
state tax on paper and ink from which the vast majority of newspapers in the state were
exempt. Minnesota Star, 460 U.S. at 577-79. Distinguishing a prior decision, the Court
observed that exemption of certain workers from the Fair Labor Standards Act did not
preclude application of the Act against newspaper employees when such exemptions were
merely exceptions to the general rule of coverage. See id. at 583 n.5 ("The exempt enterprises
in Oklahoma Presswere isolated exemptions and not the rule.") (discussing Oklahoma Press
Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,192-93 (1946)); see also University ofPa. v. EEOC, 493
U.S. 182, 201 (1990) ("'[T]he First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental
burdening of the press that may result from enforcement of civil or criminal statutes ofgeneral
applicability."') (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (holding that First
Amendment does not allow reporter to decline to testify under grand jury subpoena)).
Similarly, although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempts numerous persons and
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C. UnderinclusiveSecular Classificationsand the
"Normal" StandardofReview

The Smith doctrine calls for heightened scrutiny of underinclusive but religiously
neutral classifications that incidentally burden religious exercise only when the
underinclusion is so dramatic that religious exercise is effectively singled out for
differential treatment'" This is a substantial departure from the treatment of
underinclusive classifications under fundamental rights/equal protection analysis.
Under that analysis, underinclusion in a classification that burdens a fundamental
right or interest is subject to heightened scrutiny, even if the classifying trait is not
suspect or the burden is incidental. If the free exercise of religion is a fundamental
right, then one would expect heightened scrutiny of underinclusive classifications
that incidentally burden religion well before the point at which underinclusion turns
16 7
into religious targeting.
Ironically, Smith itself belies the suggestion that a law loses general applicability
only when it effectively targets religious activity. In order to distinguish (rather than
overrule) the Unemployment CompensationCasesin Smith, the Court contended that
denial of a religious exemption from a burdensome law should be strictly scrutinized
when the law provides a structure or procedure for "individualized government
assessmenf' of exemption claims.'" Though it has been derided as a make-weight
argument concocted only to cover the Court's embarrassment at.abandoning the
exemption doctrine it had just affirmed a year earlier,6 9 the individualized
assessment exception to Smith is better understood as deriving from suspicion of
underinclusive government action when a law grants government agents substantial
discretion in determining the scope of the law's coverage and enforcement with
respect to a fundamental right. 7

entities from complying with its provisions, the Court considers it to be a generally applicable
law. See University ofPa., 493 U.S. at 200. The Court presumably came to this conclusion
because those not exempted from Title VII are sufficiently diverse that none can be said to
have been targeted.
166. See supra Part IV.B.
167. See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise at the Millenium: Living with Smith 11
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the IndianaLaw Journal)(suggesting that some laws
that "stop short of targeting religion" may nevertheless fall "belowthe minimum standard of
general applicability").
168. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
169. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 5, at 1278 (noting that Justice Scalia
"struggled unconvincingly" to distinguish the Unemployment CompensationCases);Laycock,
supranote 9, at 47 ("The Court's exception for the unemployment compensation cases...
seems to be an arbitrary exception for unemployment compensation only, based on nothing
but precedent, like the distinction between baseball and football in antitrust law."); Smolla,
supra note 4, at 935 ("If the Smith Court's insistence that prior cases could be explained as
hybrid constitutional claims appeared disingenuous, its argument that the Sherbert line of
cases was distinguishable on the [basis of individualized exemptions] was equally lame.").
170. Cf.C. Edwin Baker, UnreasonedReasonableness:MandatoryParadePermitsand
Time, Place, and MannerRegulations,78 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 961 (1984) (observing that
among the "easy bases for invalidation" of time, place, or manner regulations under the Free
Speech and Assembly Clauses is "the standardless provision for administratively granting
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Unemployment compensation programs generally excuse applicants from
complying with program eligibility requirements whenever they can show "good
cause."'' In other words, unemployment compensation programs presuppose that
many applicants will be excused from satisfying particular eligibility requirements
for receipt of benefits, and that the various reasons applicants give will be
individually considered." Smith states that "where the State has in place a system of
individual[ized] exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
'religious hardship' without compelling reason."' " In short, Smith mandates that
when the government considers individual circumstances in administering the
requirements of a program, it must excuse program participants from requirements
that burden their religious practices, even though the burden is incidental. 74
Neither religious neutrality nor the Court's definition of general applicability can
account for the imposition of strict scrutiny in the Unemployment Compensation
Cases. Unemployment eligibility requirements do not facially discriminate on the
basis of religion; ifthey did, there is little doubt that they would be struck down under
the Equal Protection Clause and both Religion Clauses." Nor are they normally
applied in such a way that religious applicants are the only ones denied exemptions

exemptions").
Unfettered discretion was an alternative holding for the result in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886), in which the Court invalidated a facially neutral San Francisco laundry
regulation ordinance that had been applied by the board of supervisors so as to grant a permit
to operate a laundry to virtually every Caucasian applicant, and to deny a permit to every
Chinese applicant. Id. at 373-74. Yick Wo is included in American constitutional law
casebooks to illustrate how a pattern of racial discrimination will be found to violate the
Equal Protection Clause even when it takes place under a facially neutral law. See, e.g.,
GERALD GUNTHBED & KAmLaEwM. SULLVAN, CONSTITUTiONAL LAW 750 (13th ed. 1997);
W=umxB. LOCKHARTET AL., CONSTYTIrONAL LAW 1182-83 (8th ed. 1996); GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1396 (3d ed. 1996).The bulk of the opinion, however,
is an argument that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, not as it was applied,
because it specified no standards controlling the board's discretion regarding who would
receive permits. Id. at 366-73. Unfettered bureaucratic discretion in granting laundry and
other such permits was thought to violate the prohibition on class legislation, because without
standards the competition for permits would unavoidably end in favoritism and corruption.
See GiLMAN, supra note 117, at 71.
171. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
172. See id. ("The 'good cause' standard created a mechanism for individualized
exemption." (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986))).
173. Id. at 884. The Court did not apply this reasoning in Smith itself because the
religiously motivated conduct at issue there was not merely inconsistent with program
eligibility requirements, as in the Unemployment Compensation Cases, but also violated a
criminal prohibition. See id. at 876, 884-85.
174. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 721-22 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result) ("To the extent that other food stamp and welfare applicants are, in
fact, offered exceptions and special assistance in response to their inability to 'provide'
required information, it would seem that a religious inability should be given no less
deference.").
175. See supra text accompanying notes 65-75, 83-93.
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from eligibility requirements; 76 in addition to religious motivations, there are
countless secular reasons that likewise do not count as "good cause" for exemption
from eligibility requirements. In other words, it is not the case that any secular reason
but no religious reason will excuse one from eligibility requirements; to the contrary,
those whose religious beliefs and practices are burdened by eligibility requirements
generally have plenty ofnonreligious companywhose comparable secularbeliefs and
practices are similarly burdened.
Why, then, does the fact that unemployment compensation bureaucracies typically
exempt, say, claimants with terminally ill children from the work availability
requirement, require that courts strictly scrutinize the bureaucracies' failure also to
exempt applicants with sincere religious objections from this requirement? That
government chooses to burden or benefit certain activities does not normally trigger
heightened scrutiny, even when the defining classification is underinclusive-that is,
even when activities that seem to be similarly situated with respect to the law's goal
are treated differently. As Professor Volokh has pointed out, the government's
provision of exemptions for secular activities without providing exemptions for
comparable religious activities merely shows "'that the legislature values the
exempted secular activities more highly' than the [nonexempt] religious activities."'"
What triggers strict scrutiny when numerous people are excused from eligibility
requirements for certain secular reasons but not for similar religious reasons is not
a lack of either religious neutrality or what the Court defines as general applicability,
but that the free exercise of religion is a fundamental right, the protection of which
is specified by the constitutional text. As I have previously discussed, heightened
scrutiny of underinclusive classifications drawn on nonsuspect traits is appropriate
when the classification burdens a fundamental right. In that event, the government
must provide more in the way of justification than its bare desire to favor the
exempted activity or penalize the nonexempted activity. As Professor Laycock has
argued, a pattern of exempting secular activity but not religious activity "reflects a
legislative judgment that the free exercise of religion is less important than the
demands of some special interest group of no constitutional significance. But that is
a judgment inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee."" n Thus,

176. But see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 148 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that an exemption
was required because Florida treated religious claimants less favorably than other claimants);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,722 n.17 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the result) (arguing that exemptions were required in Thomas v. ReviewBd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), to prevent the religious claims in those
cases from being treated less favorably than other claims). Professors Eisgruber and Sager
argue that this is the better explanation for the Unemployment Compensation Cases.
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 5, at 1278-81.
177. Volokh, supra note 38, at 1541 (quoting Laycock, supra note 9, at 51). Because he
maintains that judgments about the extent to which religious activities are comparable to
exempted secular activities are better made by legislatures than courts, Professor Volokh
believes that laws which favor secular activities over apparently similar religious activities
by exempting the former but not the latter, are "perfectly proper." Id. at 1540-41.
178. Laycock, supranote 9, at 51.
Although I disagree with Professor Perry's general suggestion for implementing the
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the Court's explanation of its unemployment compensation cases would seem to
require that religion get something analogous to most-favored nation status.
Religious speech should be treated as well as political.speech, religious land uses
should be treated as well as any other land use of comparable intensity, and so
forth. Alleged distinctions-explanations that a proposed religious use will cause
more problems
than some other use already approved-should be subject to strict
17
scrutiny. 9
This analysis need not be confined to situations in which government actors exercise
administrative discretion, 8 ' and lower courts have applied this broad understanding

of general applicabilty in wider contexts."'

antidiscrimination norm of the Free Exercise Clause, see supra note 115, his approach works
well in cases of underinclusive secular exemptions: government refusal to exempt religious
conduct, when such an exemption would not undermine a law any more than already-exempt
secular conduct, is strong circumstantial evidence of government hostility to religion.
179. Id. at 48-49; accordBowen, 476 U.S. at 721-22 (Stevens, J., concuning in part and
concurring in the result) ("[O]ur recent free exercise cases suggest that religious claims
should not be disadvantaged in relation to other claims."); Eisgruber & Sager, supranote 5,
at 1283 (arguing that under a principle of"equal regard," government should "treat the deep,
religiously inspired concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard as that
enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally").
180.
While the Supreme Court did speak in terms of "individualized exemptions" in
Smith andLukumi, it is clear from those decisions that the Court's concern was
the prospect of the government's deciding that secular motivations are more
important than religious motivations. If anything, this concern is only further
implicated when the government does not merely create a mechanism for
individualized exemptions, but instead, actually creates a categorical exemption
for individuals with a secular objection but not for individuals with a religious
objection.
Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993)); accordRader
v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1552-53 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding a state university policy
whichprovided categorical and individualized exemptions for secularly motivated conduct but
no exemptions for religiously motivated conduct to be a selective imposition of burdens on
religion).
181. For example, FraternalOrderofPolice, 170 F.3d at 366, 367, struck down under the
Free Exercise Clause a police department rule prohibiting beards as applied against Muslim
officers, because a formal departmental policy of granting medical exemptions but not
religious exemptions
indicates that the Department has made a value judgment that secular (i.e.,
medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important enough to overcome its
general interest in uniformity but that religious motivations are not [W]hen the
government makes a value judgment in favor of secular motivations, but not
religious motivations, the government's actions must survive heightened
scrutiny.... We are at a loss to understand why religious exemptions threaten
important city interests but medical exemptions do not.
Id. at 366-67; accord Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1553 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding
that parietal rule requiring that freshman live in university housing is not generally applicable,
where "exceptions are granted... for a variety of nonreligious reasons, [but] not granted for
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It is important to emphasize that the application of fundamental rights/equal
protection analysis to incidental free exercise burdens would not require religious
conduct to be exempted from a law whenever any secular conduct is exempted.
Religion is treated unequally only if nonexempted religions conduct is in the same
relationship to the purpose of a law as exempted secular conduct. When the
government can show that exempted secular conduct is substantially different in
terms of the purpose of the law than nonexempted religious conduct, failing to
exempt the latter does not violate equality." What fundamental rights/equal
protection analysis requires in the context of incidental burdens on religion is that
religions conduct be exempted from a law whenever exemption of such conduct
would not present a substantially greater threat to the purpose of the law than
already-exempt secular conduct. Fundamental rights/equal protection analysis makes
clear that any law or government action that excuses-by administrative exemption,
legislative exemption, or otherwise-one or more secular activities but not
comparablereligious practices creates a classificationthat impermissiblyburdens the
fundamental right of free exercise of religion, and thus should normally be subject to
strict scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION: THE SMITH DOCTRINE AND THE
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION AS
A NONPREFERRED RIGHT

If the Smith doctrine were truly normal, there would be no Rational Basis Rule;
incidental burdens imposed by government on religions practices would be subject
to the same intermediate scrutiny currently applied to incidental burdens imposed by
government on speech and expression." If the Smith doctrine were truly normal,
there would be no Permissive Accommodation Rule; religious classifications used by
government to facilitate religious exercise would run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause in the same way that benign or remedial use of race or any other suspect
classifying trait now violates the clause."&And if the Smith doctrine were truly
normal, the Strict Scrutiny Exception would apply to all underinclusive government
action that burdens religion, and not just to government action that is so dramatically
underinclusive as to constitute religious targeting; underinclusive government action
that burdens religion would be subject to strict scrutiny under the fundamental

religious reasons," "[o]ver one third ofthe freshman students... are not required to comply
with the parietal rule," and there existed a system of individualized assessment which
"refused to extend exceptions to freshman... for religious reasons"); Horen v. Virginia, 479
S.E.2d 553, 557 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that government intent to discriminate against
religion may be inferred from state law prohibiting possession of owl feathers which
exempted'axidermists, academics, researchers, museums, and educational institutions," but
not those who possess owl feathers for bona fide religious uses).
182. See, e.g., FraternalOrder ofPolice, 170 F.3d at 366 (holding that strict scrutiny of
no-beard rule is triggered by medical exemption but not by exemption for undercover officers,
because the former undermines the department's interest in promoting unifornity whereas
the latter does not, since undercover officers are not held out to the public as police officers).
183. See supra Part I.
184. See supra Part i.
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rights/equal protection doctrine, just as that doctrine mandates strict scrutiny of
underinclusive government action that burdens the right to procreation, the right to
travel, and other fundamental constitutional rights."
But of course, it is precisely the fundamentality of the free exercise of religion, its
status as a preferred constitutional right, that the Smith doctrine repudiates. By
applying minimal orno scrutiny to incidental burdens on religious exercise under the
Rational Basis Rule, the Court is not treating free exercise rights like speech rights;
to the contrary, it is treating free exercise rights like "rights" to be free from price
controls or income taxes or zoning restrictions." The Smith doctrine prescribes the
same level of protection that the Court gives to nonfundamental social and economic
interests that do not fall within the domain of a preferred constitutional liberty, which
is to say, no protection at all.
Similarly, by applying strict scrutiny only to underinclusive classifications that
amount to religious targeting under the Strict Scrutiny Exception, the Court is not
treating free exercise rights like privacy, speech, travel, and otherfundamental rights.
By failing to increase the scrutiny level for underinclusive classifications that burden
the free exercise of religion, the Smith doctrine treats burdens on the free exercise of
religion in the same manner that it treats indirect burdens on nonfundamental social
and economic interests under the Constitution: as "not subject to special treatment
under the Equal Protection Clause, because they are not distinguishable in any
relevant way from other [police power] regulations in 'the area of economics and
social welfare.'""
Additionally, clearly recognizing the preferred status of religious free exercise
might justify the Permissive Accommodation Rule. Protection of nonfundamental
social and economic interests can never count as a compelling state interest whose
protection by a suspect classification satisfies strict scrutiny. Avoiding the violation
of a fundamental right, however, may well be such an interest."s Moreover, the Court
has upheld government efforts to facilitate or subsidize the exercise of fundamental
rights, even when it does so on constitutionally suspect grounds. 1 Ifthe free exercise

185. See supra Part IV.
186. See Laycock, supra note 9, at 18, 20 ("If it were true that the Court had rejected all
challenges to formally neutral rules that suppress speech, that would support Smith by
analogy. But mere formal neutrality does not put restrictions on speech beyond challenge in
the way that formally neutral restrictions on religious practice now appear to be beyond
challenge.").
187. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,232 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970)).
188. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Rules ofEngagementfor Cultural Wars: Regulating
Conducts, UnprotectedSpeech, andProtectedExpressioninAnti-AbortionProtests-Section
11, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1163, 1199 (1996) ("Protecting the ability ofindividualsto exercise
a fundamental right may be an independently compelling justification for regulating
expressive activity outside medical clinics that provide abortion services."); cf.Capital Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1995) ("[C]ompliance with the
Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-based
restrictions on speech.").
189. See, e.g., National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998)
("[T]he Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be
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of religion were clearly designated as a fundamental right, the Permissive
Accommodation Rule would be less constitutionally problematic. But if the free
exercise of religion were a fundamental right, neither the Rational Basis Rule nor the
narrow definition of general applicability under the Strict Scrutiny Exception could
pass as normal constitutional doctrine.
Nothing in the First Amendment or the rest of the Constitution requires free
exercise doctrine to mirror the doctrinal structure of other constitutional rights.
Nevertheless, it seems intuitively correct that similar rights should be enforced to a
similar extent with similar doctrine. Having determined in Smith that religions
exemptions are doctrinally aberrant under the Constitution, the Courtproperly sought
a return to normality. But the Smith doctrine is not constitutionally normal. Indeed,
in comparison to the doctrinal structure of other constitutional rights, the Smith
doctrine is at least as aberrational,as the exemption doctrine it replaced, if not more
so. Is it not perverse to pretend that incidental burdens on religious practices raise no
constitutional issue under the Free Exercise Clause, when incidental burdens on
expression are subject to heightened scrutiny under the Speech Clause? Is it not
perverse to allow use of suspect religious classifications to protect believers from
burdens on their religious practices, but to prohibit use of suspect racial
classifications to protect minorities from the historical effects of racism? And is it not
perverse to permit government to be more protective of nonpreferred rights and
interests under the Equal Protection Clause than of a right that is expressly
enumerated in the text of the First Amendment?
The one thing that seemed beyond question prior to Smith was that "the Free
19
Exercise Clause is a guarantee of individual religious liberty.""
Indeed, only three
years before deciding Smith, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt to read liberty
norms out of the Free Exercise Clause, on the ground that this would reduce the
constitutional protection afforded by the Clause to the antidiscrimination protection
already provided by the Equal Protection Clause.'9 Thus, the biggest perversity is the
Smith doctrine's erasure of religious free exercise as a fundamental right. Under the
Smith doctrine, the Free Exercise Clause is doctrinally redundant, circumscribing no
special domain ofpreferred liberty, protecting nothing that is not also fully protected

impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake. So long as
legislation does not infringe on other constitutionally protected rights, Congress has wide
latitude to set spending priorities."); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) ('This Court has long
recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices
and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause."' (quoting Hobbie,480 U.S.

at 144-45.)).
190. KennethL. Karst, Religious FreedomandEqual Citizenship:Reflections on Lukumi,
69 TUL. L. REv. 335, 350 (1994) (emphasis added).

191. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Conm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987)
(opinion of O'Connor, J.) (rejecting argument that Free Exercise Clause requires only that
government action which burdens religion be neutral, generally applicable, and a reasonable

means of implementing the government's objectives, because .'[s]uch a test has no basis in
precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal
scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides."' (quoting with approval Bowen
v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986))).
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by another constitutional provision-which is to say, the Free Exercise Clause now
protects nothing at all. One need not advocate return of the exemption doctrine to
hope that the Smith doctrine may yet be recognized as the greater constitutional
abnormality.

